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Overview 
This document is a flight test report from the operational perspective for the No Chase Certificate of 
Waiver or Authorization (COA) flights, or NCC flights, a major milestone of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. Discussions of a demonstration event 
began as early as 2014 and the actual flight of the Ikhana UAS into the NAS without a safety chase vehicle 
in Class A, E, and D airspace was accomplished on 12 June, 2018. 
The major goal of this flight was to demonstrate an alternate means of compliance to the see and avoid 
regulations for a UAS using Detect and Avoid (DAA) technology. 
Participants in this flight activity and planning included the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Ames Research Center, NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center, General Atomics Aeronautical 
Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), Honeywell International, Inc., and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
During system checkout (SCO), stakeholders analyzed their DAA system in flight test scenarios known as 
Scripted Encounters. The Ikhana ownship flew encounters against intruders of various equipage and 
performance. Once the system was tested with stressing cases that could be encountered in the NAS, a 
photo chase flight was performed for operational rehearsal and execution, and finally, the flight without 
chase was achieved. 
Table 1 is a summary of events for NCC, with major milestones highlighted in green. 
Ultimately, all NCC phase 1 project milestones were fully achieved. The minimum success criteria of 
receiving the COA to fly without chase was obtained in March 2018. Full success criteria was achieved 
once the flight without chase was completed in June 2018. This positive outcome is largely attributed to 
the experience acquired from the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xu Self Separation (SS) 
Initial flight test flown in December 2014, Flight Test Series 3 (FT3) flown in the summer of 2015, Flight 
Test Series 4 (FT4) flown in the summer of 2016, and ACAS Xu Flight Test 2 (FT2) flown in the summer of 
2017. 
Thanks to the training, member participation, systems integration/testing, in-depth analysis of the test 
points, safety discussions, route feedback, and support from the FAA, the UAS-NAS team was able to 
??????? a successful, safe, and aviation-history making flight into the NAS with a UAS employing DAA 
technology. 
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Table 1. No Chase COA Summary. 
No Chase COA Summary 
Date Event Description 
2/25/2013 
NAC Aeronautics Committee, UAS Sub 
Committee recommendation to conduct a bold 
demonstration in the NAS 
NAC recommendation to do more than just conduct research and 
collect data but to employ its unique capabilities to conduct a 
“Bold Flight Demonstration”. 
6/2/2014 Demonstration Kick-Off Meeting Initial planning activities; develop goals and objectives 
Dec. 2014 ACAS Xu SS ACAS Xu Flight Testing 
Summer 2015 Flight Test Series 3 FT3 Flight Testing 
Summer 2016 Flight Test Series 4 FT4 Flight Testing 
12/15/2016 NCC Strategy Meeting Meeting at GA-ASI to discuss planning for NCC 
2/2/2017 NCC Coordination WG Earliest meeting on record with NCC name 
5/31/2017 Phase I MOPS Released DAA and ATAR Phase I MOPS 
Summer 2017 ACAS Xu FT2 ACAS Xu FT2 Flight Testing 
10/27/2017 AFRC COA Brief to Management Brief to AFRC upper management 
10/30/2017 COA Submission Old system for COAs 
12/20/2017 COA Re-submission into CAPS Added "CONOPS" section, route modified 
2/1/2018 NCC SCO Tabletop Team training 
2/8/2018 NCC SCO Tech Brief Brief to AFRC upper management 
2/14/2018 NCC SCO Flight 1 Ikhana only 
2/15/2018 NCC SCO Flight 2 With intruder 
2/21/2018 FAA SRMP Day 1 AFRC hosted FAA event, day 1 
2/22/2018 FAA SRMP Day 2 AFRC hosted FAA event, day 2 
2/28/2018 NCC SCO Flight 3 With intruder, attempt 1 
3/30/2018 COA Approved FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment, 2017-WSA-148-COA 
3/21/2018 NCC Flight 3 Follow-up Tech Brief Brief to AFRC upper management 
3/28/2018 NCC SCO Flight 3 With intruder, attempt 2 
4/5/2018 C-Band C2 STA Not Approved 
STA to approve use of C-Band LOS C2 outside of SUA was denied 
due to the FAA Spectrum Office ?????????????????????????? the N?? 
operations and risk mitigations.?Multiple FAA Spectrum Office and 
UAS Integration Office coordination meetings followed. 
5/10/2018 NCC Demo Tech Brief Brief to AFRC upper management 
5/10/2018 NCC Demo Tabletop Team training 
5/23/2018 STAs for Operations with Chase Approved STAs included C-Band C2, DPX-7 Transponder, TPA-100 TCAS, ARC-210 VHF Radio 
5/24/2018 NCC Demo With Chase Mission execution (photo chase) 
6/6/2018 STAs for Operations without Chase Approved STAs included C-Band C2, DPX-7 Transponder, TPA-100 TCAS, ARC-210 VHF Radio, ATAR 
6/12/2018 NCC Demo Without Chase Mission execution (no chase) 
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1 Introduction 
The desire and ability to fly UAS in the NAS is of increasing urgency. The application of unmanned aircraft 
(UA) to perform national security, defense, scientific, and emergency management are driving the critical 
need for less restrictive access by UAS to the NAS. UAS represent a new capability which will provide a 
variety of services in the government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation sectors. The growth of this 
potential industry has not yet been realized due to the lack of a common understanding of what is 
required to safely operate UAS in the NAS. 
 
NASA’s UAS Integration in the NAS (UAS-NAS) Project is conducting research in the areas of Separation 
Assurance/Sense and Avoid Interoperability, Human Systems Integration (HSI), and Communications to 
support reducing the barriers to routine UAS access to the NAS. This research is broken into two research 
themes namely, UAS Integration and Test Infrastructure. 
 
UAS Integration focuses on airspace integration procedures and performance standards to enable UAS 
integration in the air transportation system, covering Sense and Avoid (SAA) performance standards, 
command and control performance standards, and human systems integration. With the help of the UAS-
NAS Integrated Test & Evaluation (IT&E) team, the Phase I Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
(MOPS) for DAA and Air-to-Air Radar (ATAR) systems was released in May 2017. 
 
The focus of Test Infrastructure was to enable development and validation of airspace integration 
procedures and performance standards, including integrated test and evaluation. In support of integrated 
test and evaluation efforts, the Project developed an adaptable and scalable relevant test environment 
capable of evaluating concepts and technologies for UAS to safely operate in the NAS.  
 
To accomplish this task of establishing relevant test environments, the Project conducted a series of 
Human-in-the-Loop and Flight Test activities that integrated key concepts, technologies, and procedures 
in a relevant air traffic environment, leading up to the NCC demonstration. Each of the integrated events 
was built on the technical achievements, fidelity and complexity of the previous tests and technical 
simulations, and resulted in research findings that supported the development of regulations governing 
the access of UAS into the NAS. 
 
To demonstrate the achievements of phase 1 of the NASA UAS Integration in the NAS Project, the team 
elected to pursue a flight activity with NASA 870 (“Ikhana”) UAS operating in the NAS without a safety 
chase vehicle. This report details the events that led up to this NCC flight. 
 
1.1 Scope 
Detailed NCC flight activity and design coordination began in early 2017, although high-level discussions 
of executing a demonstration flight without chase began much earlier than this date, in 2014. The COA 
application for approval to fly without chase was submitted into the older COA Online system on 30 
October, 2017, and re-submitted with additional information on 20 December, 2017. System checkout 
flights with the DAA system within Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) R-2515 airspace occurred February-
March 2018. Finally, a flight with photo chase was executed on 24 May, 2018, and the flight into the NAS 
without chase was executed on 12 June, 2018. 
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This report addresses the genesis of the design of the COA route and safety case, submission, design 
iterations, system checkouts, NAS flights, deficiencies with the DAA system or methods, preliminary tests 
results and analysis, and lessons learned. Further details about this configuration are described in the 
main body of this test report. This report also serves as a general progress report for the IT&E sub-project. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of the NCC flight demonstrations was to obtain FAA operational approval of a UAS, equipped 
with DAA capabilities as an alternate means of compliance to see and avoid regulations, to execute a 
specific route of flight in the NAS without a safety chase aircraft. This effort engaged the FAA certification, 
safety, and operational approval organizations and in the process, informed policy development and the 
processing of similar COAs to enable less restrictive UAS access to the NAS. During the flight 
demonstrations which transited several airspace classes, the UAS pilot employed the DAA system to 
coordinate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and maintain safe separation from other aircraft. 
 
Testing facilities were Government owned, managed, leased, or under agreement and fall into two 
categories:  
 
1. Development Facilities: 
• Research Aircraft Integration Facility (RAIF) at NASA Armstrong 
• GA-ASI Grey Butte Flight Test Facility 
• GA-ASI Poway System Integration Lab 
• Honeywell International Inc., Redmond, WA 
2. Test Facilities: 
• RAIF at NASA Armstrong 
• Dryden Aeronautical Test Range (DATR) at NASA Armstrong 
• Mission Control Center 3 (MCC3) Mission Control Room at NASA Armstrong 
• The Radio Frequency (RF) Communications facility at NASA Armstrong 
• Edwards R-2508 Complex 
 
1.3 Stakeholders, Participants, and Responsibilities 
The NASA Integrated Aviation Systems Program (IASP) provided direction for the UAS-NAS project. The 
project office had the overall responsibility for NCC flight test activity. NASA Ames, NASA Armstrong, GA-
ASI, Honeywell, and the FAA supported the project or were participants. The following is a brief 
description of responsibilities: 
 
• NASA Ames Research Center (ARC): NASA Ames provided ATC expertise on development of the 
NCC route through the NAS. They were also present at Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center 
(ARTCC) during the demonstration flights. 
• NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC): NASA Armstrong was the responsible test 
organization for all test missions flown from AFRC. AFRC hosted the Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) 
infrastructure for data collection and distribution. AFRC also provided some live manned aircraft 
used as intruders during system checkout. NASA 870 (“Ikhana”) was the unmanned aircraft 
ownship platform for Scripted Encounters within the R-2515 airspace (part of R-2508), as well as 
the flight into the NAS. The Ground Control Station (GCS) housing part of the DAA system and 
Ikhana pilots was also located at AFRC. 
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• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI): Provided hardware, software and 
integration support on the Ikhana UAS, in particular the GA-ASI designed DAA system. GA-ASI 
provided the ATAR and other DAA system related avionics. GA-ASI also provided the DAA 
algorithm, the Conflict Prediction and Display System (CPDS), which was used to fly scripted 
encounters and operate in the NAS. 
• Honeywell International, Inc.: Honeywell provided the hardware, software and integration 
support for the Surveillance and Tracking Module (STM)/ACAS prototype processor that 
contained the Honeywell Fusion Tracker and TCAS II. 
• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): The FAA provided guidance through the development of 
the COA application and ensured the pertinent information was provided for COA approval. The 
FAA provided critical feedback throughout the route design. They also held a Safety Risk 
Management Panel (SRMP), hosted at AFRC, to review the hazards associated with the proposed 
mission of flying a DAA equipped UAS in the NAS without chase and their corresponding 
mitigations. Finally, the FAA provided coordination to ensure resolution of spectrum management 
issues associated with the equipment and airspace needed for the demonstration.  
 
1.4 Working Groups 
Throughout the flight test activity, communication was critical in order to achieve proper coordination, 
deadlines, and milestones. For this reason, several working groups (WG) were held to facilitate planning 
activities. 
1.4.1 NCC Coordination 
The NCC Coordination WG, which met weekly, involved software and hardware integration leads, 
operations, and project engineers and managers. This WG was the main platform to discuss changes or 
updates to the aircraft, Ikhana GCS, system safety gap analysis, and overall timeline planning. The 
operational planning perspective of this WG fed into the Operations Working Group (OWG) as the team 
came closer to the actual flights. 
1.4.2 Operations Working Group 
The NCC OWG was a collaborative effort between all stakeholders and participants for the NCC flights. 
The OWG, which met weekly and fortnightly prior to testing, discussed all NCC ground and flight 
operations topics. This WG was responsible for flight planning and coordination, assigning actions items, 
safety concerns which would feed into the System Safety Working Group (SSWG), hardware integration 
and testing discussion, training, and readiness. The OWG was a pre-established meeting for success, its 
pedigree being built upon since the ACAS Xu 2014 flight tests. 
1.4.3 System Safety Working Group 
The SSWG included project engineers and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to review, discuss, and track 
existing hazards, identify new hazards, and to decide what mitigations to put in place for each. The NCC 
project team conducted a Hazard Analysis for SCO and the Demo. A Safety Engineer was present for all 
operations planning and chaired the SSWG. The SSWG performed a hazard analysis by identifying 
potential hazards, mitigation methods, evaluating the final probability and severity of the mitigated 
hazards, and documenting the hazard analysis on a formal Hazard Report. This WG was available as a 
forum to discuss and refine concerns through the lifecycle of the NCC project. 
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2 Development 
Although the main goal of the project was to receive a COA and to conduct a single safe and successful 
flight in the NAS using a DAA system without a chase, great benefits were obtained from the development 
and test process, which spanned several years prior to the 12 June, 2018 flight. 
The UAS-NAS project involvement in the flight test activity began with its support and participation in the 
2014 flight test of ACAS Xu and SS Initial Flight Test. This was followed in 2015 with FT3, FT4 in 2016, and 
ACAS Xu FT2 in 2017. Each of these flight test series significantly contributed to building up infrastructure, 
developing procedures, and reducing risk for the NCC flight activity. These flight events greatly supported 
the tasks of performing checkout flights of the system, as well as increasing team readiness for flying into 
the NAS. Much of the same team members whom supported the initial flights were part of the NCC flight 
campaign and their knowledge, experience, and lessons learned aided with this activity. Over 1000 air-to-
air encounters were accomplished safely and successfully during the span of these flight tests. 
2.1 Objectives 
The NCC activity was divided into two separate and distinct flight activities. The first activity, SCO, served 
to provide a final checkout of the system before flying into the NAS. The second, called Demonstration 
“Demo” flights, sought to employ the DAA technology while flying in the NAS: once with chase (as an 
operational rehearsal) and once without. 
2.1.1 System Checkout 
The DAA system (Figure 1) being employed as an alternate means of compliance to 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) §91.111(a) and §91.113(b) “see and avoid/remain well clear” rules was comprised of 
airborne sensors and track processors to detect, track, and generate DAA alerts and maneuver guidance 
information against proximate aircraft if their trajectories were predicted to lead to loss of well clear. 
Additional information on the system can be found in Section 2.3. 
The NCC SCO primary technical goal, described as Scripted Encounters, was to conduct regression testing 
on the NCC system release 1108.1.0 Rev-, conduct air-to-air encounters representative of NAS operations 
(including Collision Avoidance (CA) with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and stressing 
Special Committee (SC)-228 operational cases), and ensure DAA remain well clear maneuver operations 
while in full Ku SATCOM C2 (uplink and downlink). 
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Figure 1.  NCC System Architecture. 
 IT&E Objectives 
The test objectives were developed by the IT&E team and informed the flight test matrix and objectives 
matrix. Similar to the test objectives template used in FT4, which tested multiple geometric encounters 
with diverse types of intruders, the NCC objectives included the geometry of the encounter, 
hardware/software configuration for the ownship and intruders, and overall objective of the encounter. 
Table 2 shows the objectives matrix for each type of encounter. In order to ensure DAA system 
functionality and performance before flights into the NAS, regression testing was required to stress the 
system. It was determined select modified encounters from FT4 would suffice to meet the overall purpose 
of the NCC SCO. Use case Concept of Operations (CONOPS) encounters, such as a Ku-band C2 link only 
encounter, were also required to replicate scenarios which would occur when in the NAS. 
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Table 2. No Chase COA System Checkout Objectives Matrix. 
Encounter Objective Name 
Alt 
Regime 
(ft MSL) 
Intruder Vert Offset Maneuver Coop/Non-Coop Priority Notes 
1. Test Modes (Ikhana) 
Mode 253 TCAS Only TM-1 >10k G-III/KA 300 ft Unmitigated Cooperative 1 
Test Mode set to 253, fused 
targets will drop and only 
Mode C targets will remain. 
2. CONOPS Use Cases (4) 
a. ATC coordinates 
maneuver (VFR Traffic) 
b. Int. maneuvers after 
DWC maneuver has 
begun, causes change 
in DWC maneuver 
c. Ikhana encounters VFR 
traffic and maneuvers 
prior to ATC approval 
d. Ikhana PIC maneuvers 
to a TCAS II RA 
a. UC-2 
b. UC-3 
c. UC-4 
d. UC-5 
a. >10k 
b. <10k 
c. <10k 
d. >10k 
KA/T-34 
a. 200 ft 
b. 300 ft 
c. 200 ft 
d. 200 ft 
Mitigated Cooperative 1 
Directly from MOPS. 
Encounter for each use 
case. 
“TC acts as ATC – Inform 
SPORT”. 
3. Radar only (squawk 
off) 
SQK -6 
SQK-7 
SQK-8 
<10k T-34/TG-14 300 ft Mitigated Non-Coop. 1 
Non-Coop <10k ft MSL. Pin 
wheel (0, 45, 90 deg.). 
4. TCAS II Reversal LOB-9 
LOB-10 >10k G-III 200 ft Advisory/Auto Cooperative 3 
Unique TCAS 
implementation. 
5. High Speed under 10k 
ft ~250 KGS HS-11 HS-12 <10k G-III 500 ft 
Mitigated/Un-
mitigated Cooperative 3 
High speed aircraft landing 
at airport transitioning 
through airspace. 
6. Nuisance 
NUIS-13 
NUIS-14 >=10k T-34/KA 1000/500 ft Unmitigated Cooperative 2 
Demonstrate system will 
provide preventative, but 
not corrective, alerting. 
System ready to fly in the 
NAS. 
7. Double Blunder 
DB-15 >=10k T-34/KA 500 ft Mitigated Cooperative 2 
Demonstrate 
representative NAS 
encounter. 
8. High Descent Rate 
HDR-16 >=10k G-III/KA 500 ft Mitigated Cooperative 2 
Demonstrate 
representative NAS 
encounter. 
9. Intruder Overtake IOT-17 
IOT-18 >=10k T-34/KA 300 ft Unmitigated 
Coop/Non-
Coop. 2 
System ready to fly in the 
NAS. 
10. Ikhana Overtake OOT-19 >=10k T-34/KA 300 ft Mitigated Cooperative 2 System ready to fly in the NAS. 
11. Blunder Maneuver, 
Left 45/90 deg. LT-20 LT-21 >=10k T-34/KA 300 ft Mitigated Cooperative 2 
Demonstrate 
representative NAS 
encounter. 
12. TCAS auto at 20k ft 
MSL ATCAS-22 
ATCAS-23 >=10k  300 ft Advisory/Auto Cooperative 3 
Demonstrate ownship 
performance with 
increased alerts and TCAS 
alerts at a higher altitude. 
13. Low Altitude at 3000 ft 
AGL LALT-24 3000 ft AGL T-34/KA 200 ft Advisory 
Coop/Non-
Coop. 1 
Intruder below at 2,800 ft 
MSL. Fly in Ku, C-Band 
VCV operations. 
14. Ikhana Turn & Descend 
OTD-25 >=10k T-34/KA 500 ft Mitigated Cooperative 2 
Top of demo route, Ikhana 
turn & descend from left & 
right. 
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 SC-228 Stressing Cases 
In addition to the IT&E objectives, it was determined to be prudent to flight test certain stressing 
operational use cases delineated in the DAA MOPS. The primary objectives of these cases were to have 
the Ikhana pilot employ the DAA and ATAR systems and interacts with ATC to fulfill the see and avoid 
responsibilities for safe flight operations. Since these encounters were conducted in R-2515, the IT&E Test 
Conductor (TC) acted as “ATC”. 
 There are four use cases described in the No Chase COA CONOPS: 
1. Ikhana pilot in command (PIC) calls out Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic to ATC and 
coordinates maneuver. 
2. Intruder maneuvers after DAA Well Clear (DWC) maneuver has begun; causes change in 
DWC maneuver. 
3. Ikhana encounters VFR traffic and maneuvers prior to ATC approval. 
4. Ikhana PIC maneuvers to a TCAS II RA. 
For the NCC SCO, it was determined that only one of these stress cases needed to be conducted. The 
second use case required the most coordination with ATC while still heavily relying on the DAA displays. 
The CONOPS for this use case is as follows: Ikhana is transiting Class E airspace and descending at 1,000 
fpm from a cruise altitude of 15,000 ft MSL to 7,000 ft MSL as depicted in Figure 2. While descending 
through 9,000 ft MSL, the Ikhana PIC receives a corrective (yellow) alert on the heads-up display (HUD) 
from its DAA system for an aircraft on a converging course level at 7,500 ft. The PIC observes the intruder 
is to the front and left converging at a 30° to 45° angle. Even though Ikhana has the right of way per 14 
CFR §91.113, the PIC cannot assume that the other aircraft will see Ikhana and maneuver to avoid, so the 
Ikhana PIC decides to maneuver. Since the projected encounter is still 55 seconds out, the PIC calls ATC 
and requests a left turn to pass beside the intruder, e.g.: “Joshua Approach, NASA 870 requests deviation 
left for traffic below.” After permission, the Ikhana PIC acknowledges and, while continuing the descent, 
maneuvers the aircraft left so that the intruder will pass to the right.  
After the maneuver, the Ikhana PIC observes the intruder turning right and converging again; the 
corrective alert has not cleared. Due to the more urgent situation, the PIC levels off the UA at 8,300 ft to 
allow the intruder to pass underneath. After the level-off is complete, the Ikhana PIC notifies ATC of the 
level-off due to traffic, e.g.: “Joshua Approach, NASA 870 just leveled off due to traffic, will continue 
descent to seven thousand when clear of traffic.” ATC then acknowledges: “NASA 870, acknowledge 
advisory for traffic.” When clear of traffic, the Ikhana PIC informs ATC of their intent to continue: “Joshua 
Approach, NASA 870 continuing descent to seven thousand.” 
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Figure 2.  Maneuvers after DWC Maneuver has Begun. 
2.1.2 Demonstration 
The NCC flight sought to demonstrate that a UAS equipped with a DAA system could safely perform a 
mission with other aircraft in the NAS. The DAA capabilities delineated in the NCC effort were 
commensurate with the Phase 1 DAA and ATAR systems MOPS. The operational environment (Figure 3) 
is a UAS transitioning from Class A or Special Use Airspace (SUA) to/from Class E and D (not including the 
airport traffic pattern) using its DAA systems to detect, track, and remain well clear of other aircraft, as 
well as transition through two ARTCCs. The planned duration was about two hours, with a duration of 
about one hour outside of SUA. 
Notional scenario example. 
Not to scale. 
ATC: Proceed as 
requested 
ATC: Descend 
Acknowledge 
UAS: Continuing 
descent to 5,000 
UAS: Just leveled 
off due to traffic. 
UAS: Request left 
deviation for traffic. 
Intruder Current Path Intruder Projected Path UAS Current Path UAS Projected Path UAS Modified Path 
4,000 ft 
5,000 ft 
6,000 ft 
7,000 ft 
9 
UAS-NAS NASA 870 Ikhana No Chase COA (NCC) Flights: Flight Test Report, August 2018 – Rev. A 
Figure 3.  NCC Concept of Operations (Demo). 
The goal of this flight profile was to demonstrate operational capability of a DAA system by remaining well 
clear of other cooperative or non-cooperative traffic while transitioning through Class A, E and D airspace. 
Ultimately, the ground-breaking event would be to transition into class E airspace without a chase 
(previously, other UAS as well as Ikhana have flown above 18,000 ft MSL without a safety chase). 
2.2 Flight Schedule and Roadmap
In order to efficiently achieve the flights into the NAS, several activities needed to occur to satisfy 
gateways for the final demo flights. Figure 4 shows these operational gateways. First, the team used its 
experience from previous flight tests to create the documentation and safety case required to submit the 
COA. Additionally, the route of the flight into the NAS needed to be created, with feedback from the FAA, 
and satisfy project requirements. Once this information was submitted, the track split off into NASA 
performing its briefings to management and performing system checkout flights. Meanwhile, the FAA 
assessed the COA and asked additional questions to NASA, with COA approval received in March of 2018. 
Finally, the paths converged and NASA performed its briefing to management (Tech Brief — the briefing 
to AFRC Senior Management where approval and conditions to proceed with flight missions is provided) 
to obtain authorization to perform the mission with the particular aircraft configuration briefed. After this 
briefing NASA management approved the proposed mission and the project proceeded with the 
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demonstration flights. The first demonstration flight included chase. After this flight the project provided 
its findings to NASA management before proceeding to the final flight into the NAS without chase. 
 
Figure 4.  NCC Operational Roadmap. 
2.3 Aircraft and System Configuration 
The team elected to use the configuration of Ikhana that was used during ACAS Xu FT2. Below is a 
description of the Ikhana Ownship that was used for the SCO and Demo flights, as well as a description of 
the intruders used in the SCO. 
2.3.1 Ikhana Predator B (NASA 870) and DAA System 
The NASA AFRC Predator B (Ikhana) is a turbo-prop single engine MQ-9 unmanned aircraft built by GA-
ASI, shown in Figure 5. Its general performance characteristics are shown in Table 3.  
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Figure 5.  NASA870 “Ikhana” UAS. 
Table 3. NASA 870 General Performance Characteristics. 
NASA 870 General Performance Characteristics 
Weight 10,500 lb 
Speed 200 kts 
Ceiling 40,000 ft 
Endurance 24 hr 
Ikhana was configured with the GA-ASI prototype DAA system that included integrated hardware and 
software components enabling the aircraft to perform pilot initiated maneuvers to remain well clear and 
respond to collision avoidance resolution advisories, either manually or automatically. The system was 
dependent upon DAA sensors. The DAA cooperative sensors in the aircraft included an Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In/Out compatible Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF), and a 
TCAS II system. An Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) ATAR was installed to detect all airborne 
targets.  
Active Surveillance / TCAS II
Ikhana was equipped with TCAS II v7.1 hosted in the Honeywell TPA-100 ACAS Processor. TCAS determines 
the relative range, altitude, and bearing of other aircraft equipped with Mode S and Air Traffic Control 
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) Mode A/C transponders. TCAS calculates the trajectory of the other 
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aircraft to determine if a potential conflict exists. TCAS operates by sending interrogations to other aircraft 
and monitoring their replies. When the TCAS II logic determines an intruder to be a collision threat, a 
vertical resolution advisory (RA) is issued. If enabled, TCAS II RAs are sent to the flight control system to 
automatically respond to vertical commands. The pilot can override these commands. During the NCC 
flight demonstrations, Ikhana was configured to respond automatically to TCAS II RAs. TCAS II RAs are 
displayed to the pilot on a head-down traffic display and the HUD in the GCS. This system is used to detect 
and track cooperative aircraft. 
 Air-to-Air Radar  
The ATAR detected and tracked aircraft within its field of regard (±15° elevation and 110° azimuth) 
regardless of whether that aircraft had other electronic means of identification. The X-Band ATAR, 
manufactured by GA-ASI, enabled detection and track of non-cooperative aircraft. 
 ADS-B In 
ADS-B surveillance was provided by the Honeywell TPA-100 ACAS Processor. It receives 1090ES signals 
and provides track data to the fusion tracker for correlation with other sensor data. Once the ADS-B track 
data is validated by active interrogations from the ACAS processor, ADS-B track data is employed in an 
extended hybrid surveillance mode to reduce 1030/1090 MHz band transmissions. This system was used 
to detect and track cooperative aircraft. 
 Fusion Tracker 
The Fusion Tracker, hosted in the Honeywell TPA-100 ACAS Processor, correlated intruder tracks from 
multiple surveillance sensors (i.e., Active Surveillance/TCAS II, ADS-B In and ATAR) into a fused track. A 
cross-check algorithm validates the fusion tracker outputs with TCAS active surveillance or ADS-B In data 
(extended hybrid surveillance) to ensure fusion track accuracy. 
 Sense and Avoid Processer 
The Sense and Avoid Processor (SAAP) served to interface DAA systems, condition track data for downlink 
to the GCS, and archive data for post-flight processing. 
 Conflict Prediction and Display System 
Figure 6 depicts the CPDS traffic display. The traffic display and the algorithm that predicts DAA loss of 
well clear was hosted in the GA-ASI laptop within the Ikhana GCS. The CPDS parsed the track data received 
from the Ikhana downlink and probed estimated trajectories for possible losses of well clear as DAA alerts 
and maneuver guidance information. This information was presented to the pilots as colored conflict 
areas or probes and “no-go” heading bands. Information was also presented on the HUD as text 
information (Figure 7) to direct the pilot to look at the traffic display for more detailed information. Loss 
of well clear occurs when the predicted closest point of approach (CPA) penetrates the well clear volume 
around the ownship defined with a 4,000 ft horizontal radius and ±450 ft altitude separation (Figure 8). 
When the loss of well clear is predicted to occur within 75 secs, a corrective (displayed as yellow) alerting 
and maneuver guidance is provided. When the loss of well clear is predicted to occur within 25 secs, a 
warning (displayed as red) alerting and maneuver guidance is provided. 
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Figure 6.  CPDS Traffic Display. 
 
Figure 7.  DAA “Corrective” Alerting on HUD. 
Yellow altitude band 
indicates <75 sec to LOWC 
“No-Go” heading band: 
Indicate time until 
LOWC 
Yellow: <75 sec to LOWC 
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Figure 8.  DAA Well Clear Volume. 
 Datalinks 
Sensor tracks and TCAS RAs were downlinked to the GCS via the Ku-Band SATCOM beyond radio line of 
sight (BRLOS) system or the digital line of sight (DLOS) system. DAA track updates were provided at a 
nominal 1 Hz rate. 
2.3.2 System Checkout Intruders 
In order to fully test the system for flights into the NAS, a variety of intruders and equipage were flown 
against Ikhana in the R-2515 airspace during SCO. A summary of these intruders is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Ownship and System Checkout Aircraft Summary and Equipage. 
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 T-34 C Mentor (NASA 865) 
The NASA AFRC T-34C Mentor is a turbo-prop single engine aircraft that seats two pilots in tandem. The 
T-34C supported the test mission as an ADS-B and TCAS I equipped intruder aircraft, and could function 
as a low-speed intruder. NASA 865 is also equipped with an Ashtech Z-12 Differential Global Positioning 
Systems (DGPS) system. 
? Weight: 4,300 lb 
? Speed: 214 kts 
? Ceiling: 25,000 ft 
? Endurance: 4 hrs 
 Beechcraft B200 (NASA 7) 
The NASA AFRC Beechcraft B200 is a twin engine turbo-prop aircraft. NASA 7 supported the test mission 
as an ADS-B and TCAS I equipped intruder aircraft. NASA 7 is also equipped with a Novatel ProPak6 DGPS 
system. 
? Weight: 12,500 lb 
? Speed: 292 kts 
? Ceiling: 35,000 ft 
? Endurance: 4.5 hrs 
 Gulfstream G-III (NASA 808) 
The NASA AFRC Gulfstream III (G-III) is a twin engine turbojet aircraft. NASA 808 supported the test mission 
as a high speed, ADS-B and TCAS II equipped intruder aircraft. NASA 808 is also equipped with a Novatel 
ProPak6 DGPS system. 
? Weight: 69,700 lb 
? Speed: 340 kts 
? Ceiling: 45,000 ft 
? Endurance: 5.5 hrs 
 Ximango TG-14 (NASA 856) 
The NASA AFRC Ximango AMT 200S (TG-14) is a single engine motorglider aircraft. NASA 856 supported 
the test mission as a low-speed, ADS-B equipped intruder aircraft. NASA 856 is also equipped with an 
Ashtech Zextreme DGPS system. 
? Weight: 1,874 lb 
? Speed: 132 kts 
? Ceiling: 10,000 ft 
? Endurance: 3.5 hrs 
2.4 Airspace 
Because of the experience and success gained during previous flight tests, the team used the R-2508 
Complex and specifically R-2515 to perform its system checkout flights. For the demonstration flight, an 
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analysis was performed for a route that would satisfy all the requirements of traversing controlled 
airspace and ARTCCs. 
2.4.1 System Checkout 
The operating area for SCO Scripted Encounters occurred in the Restricted Airspace, R-2515, located at 
EAFB, along with the Buckhorn Military Operating Area (MOA), with operations scheduled and 
coordinated through the Air Force Test Center (AFTC). Specific airspace scheduled each day during these 
flight tests included the Four Corners Area, Mercury Spin Area, overflight of the Precision Impact Range 
Area (PIRA) East/West, and the Buckhorn MOA. These areas within R-2515 are depicted within the yellow 
shaded area shown in Figure 9. 
This operating area was adequate for the majority of the encounters. However, there were some 
encounters that required either or both the intruder and ownship to extend north or west, remaining 
within R-2515, of the airspace. The extensions were required to either start or complete these encounters. 
For those encounters where an extension was required to accomplish the test encounter, approval from 
the controlling agency, Space Positioning Optical Radar Tracking (SPORT), was required. The Buckhorn 
MOA was used by the manned intruder aircraft, only. 
Additionally, during these flights, the NASA operations remained a lower priority within the complex. 
Because of this, occasional changes to the flight cards needed to occur. If the change was minute enough 
that the test point would still gather the required data, a redline was announced, recorded, and the card 
executed. However, if the change was too extensive, the test point was moved to another flight date. 
 
Figure 9.  R-2515 Flight Test Area. 
2.4.2 Demonstration 
The purpose of the demonstration flights was to choose a flight plan for NASA 870 to fly outside of 
restricted airspace, into the NAS, and without a chase vehicle into Class A (above 18,000 ft Mean Sea Level 
(MSL)), Class E (at or above/below 10,000 ft MSL), and Class D (above 2,500 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) 
at an airport with an operational control tower) airspaces, as well as flying through multiple ARTCCs. Due 
to the launch location of NASA 870 (EAFB), the team chose to keep the demonstration flights within 
California, flying into Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA) and then Oakland ARTCC (ZOA) and back. These ARTCCs are 
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highlighted in yellow in Figure 10. The flight also transited E10 Joshua Control Facility (JCF) enroute to 
Victorville airport, shown in the center of Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10.  ZLA and ZOA ARTCCs. Snippet from faa.gov. 
 
Figure 11.  ZLA ARTCC Low Sectors. Snippet from faa.gov. 
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2.5 COA Process 
Prior to submitting the actual application to the FAA for the COA, the team conducted numerous 
discussions on the safety case, route itself, and other hardware/software configuration specifications for 
the flight. However, before the discussions were finalized, the FAA notified the UAS-NAS team that the 
older “COA Online” system would no longer be accepting new applications as of 30 October, 2017. For 
this reason, and with agreement with the FAA, the team elected to submit a “draft” application through 
the old system with the intent of it being reviewed and re-submitted at a later date. 
Since the Ikhana team already had experience with submitting, using, and receiving COAs from the COA 
Online system, most of the required sections within the COA could be created quickly based on the current 
aircraft configuration. The sections that required additional modifications included the Operational and 
System descriptions, Lost Link procedures, Electronic Surveillance and Detection Capability, Visual 
Surveillance and Detection Capability (due to the waiver asking for a flight without chase), Flight 
Operations Area/Plan, and Special Circumstances, which included the safety case. The required sections 
were created, briefed to Armstrong upper management, and submitted to the COA Online system on 30 
October, 2017. The COA was then reviewed by the FAA and released back to Armstrong. The release back 
asked for a CONOPS document to summarize the flights. This release also allowed the team to make minor 
modifications to the route of flight (based on comments from the FAA) and add additional information to 
the safety case. On 20 December, 2017, the COA was re-submitted into the new online COA Application 
Processing System (CAPS). 
The next phase in the process required a thorough review from the FAA, which included conducting a 
SRMP in February 2018, described in further detail in Section 2.12.2. Once this review was conducted, 
some additional questions were brought up on the route of flight. The FAA provided modifications, and 
the COA document was officially released on 30 March, 2018. 
Upon release of the COA, additional questions arose from the FAA pertaining to the back-up command 
and control (C2) of Ikhana. A Special Temporary Authorization (STA) to approve use of C-Band Line of Sight 
(LOS) C2 outside of SUA was initially declined by the FAA Spectrum Office. In clarifying the purpose for 
this particular item, the project engaged in valuable discussions with the spectrum management 
community. These discussions led to further clarifications, for all parties, regarding research equipment 
onboard the aircraft that meet the intent of the MOPS/Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) but are not 
certified to those standards and how the project intended to use them only for the particular mission 
proposed. Eventually all parties understood the operational limitations for the equipment and the 
commensurate mitigations for the mission, and STAs for the DAA equipment were approved first for flight 
with chase; this flight occurred on 24 May 2018. Once the results from this flight were reviewed, STAs for 
operations without chase were approved, and the flight without chase was finally conducted on 12 June 
2018. The details for which equipment was authorized for each flight can be found in Table 1. 
2.6 Route Development 
The NCC mission plan was developed from early objectives dating back to 2014. Of the original objectives, 
one led to the development of the demonstration flight plan: “Demonstrate DAA and C2 MOPS 
technologies within the NAS on specific flights to/from Class A airspace, through Class E, D and possibly G 
airspaces.”  
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In order to meet minimum requirements of that objective, a local “SoCal Demo” mission was created. The 
SoCal routing would start within R-2515 where Ikhana would exit the SUA at flight level (FL)200 to the 
southeast and transit Class E airspace at 6,000 ft MSL to Southern California Logistics Airport, Victorville 
(VCV) Class D. The aircraft would fly a low approach to the VCV active runway, go missed approach and 
continue on its mission through Class E heading west. During the western leg of the mission, a “chance” 
encounter with a non-cooperative intruder aircraft would occur. Lastly Ikhana would either re-enter 
restricted airspace in Class E or climb to Class A and re-enter restricted airspace.  
Over time this original plan evolved through iteration and peer review to the mission flown in June of 
2018. Considerations for meeting the baselined objectives included such things as entering Class G 
airspace at Gray Butte shooting an approach to the active runway, flying Ikhana in Class A airspace to 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, and flying an approach at the regional airport, flying a western mission off the 
California coast transiting through the warning areas located there, to flying the established UAS corridor 
created for the Riverside Air National Guard (ANG). Ultimately a route of flight that remained overland 
and within 3 hours of EAFB was chosen. 
Several mission planning tools were used to design the route of flight including FalconView, SkyVector, 
Google Earth, Sectional Aeronautical charts and DoD Flight Information Publications. The route of flight 
was evaluated for Maximum Elevation Figure (MEF), Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA), Minimum 
Obstacle Clearance Altitude (MOCA), Off-route Obstruction Clearance Altitude (OROCA), and Minimum 
Vectoring Altitude (MVA). MVA for the VCV radar sectors was provided by the FAA Western Service 
Center. 
The NCC mission plan was carefully developed to remain off of published airways and away from known 
flight activity associated with gliders and other small aircraft that NASA did not fully test the ATAR system 
against. Flight tests were utilized to validate ATAR performance predictions using radar cross section (RCS) 
modeling and simulations for medium and large aircraft. Modeling and simulation results show sufficient 
detection and track performance against small RCS aircraft such as gliders; however, to further reduce 
risk, the flight demonstration was planned to remain clear of areas with known glider activity. 
Development of the flight demonstration mission was a collaborative effort that included contributions 
from NASA, GA-ASI, Honeywell, and the FAA. 
2.6.1 Final Route 
In order to meet the objectives established for the flight demonstration, the mission needed to depart 
restricted airspace, transit Class A, to include communication with at least two ARTCC facilities, transition 
to Class E airspace above and below 10,000 ft MSL and transition through Class D airspace before returning 
to restricted airspace. The NAS portion of the mission was flown entirely under Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR).  
The final route, shown in Figure 12, was a culmination of the inputs from the UAS-NAS, the Ikhana team, 
FAA, and industry partners, and ensured all objectives previously outlined would be met. The final route 
was comprised of 18 waypoints. The route began and finished within R-2515 at EAFB, traveling 
counterclockwise from waypoints 1-10, and then entering the VCV Area to a minimum altitude of 5,000 
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ft MSL. The NAS portion of the route was originally intended to be about 2.5 hours, but with modifications 
on speeds, altitudes, and changes to routing, the actual flights were around 2.0 hours. 
 
Figure 12.  Final Demonstration Route. 
The route began within EAFB R-2515, where the team powered up the DAA system to fly into the NAS. 
NASA 870 would begin its journey into the NAS at waypoint 1, at 20,000 ft (Class A airspace), under ZLA 
control. Ikhana would then transition through waypoints 2, 3, and, 4, with a handoff to ZOA between 
waypoints 4 and 5. After taking a sharp left turn to waypoint 6, the Ikhana pilot would request a descent 
to 15k ft MSL (Class E) and be handed back to ZLA between 6 and 7. The pilot would transition the aircraft 
through waypoint 8, request a descent to 9,000 ft MSL, and begin a descent after waypoint 9, waypoint 
10, and then the VCV area, shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Zoom-in of Demo VCV Area. 
Once within the VCV area, the pilot would maintain the aircraft at 9,000 ft MSL through waypoints 11, 12, 
13, 14, and once westbound to 15, request a descent to 6,000 ft MSL through waypoint 15. At waypoint 
15, the pilot would request a descent to 5,000 ft MSL and officially dip into the Class D airspace between 
15 and 16. At the next turn between 16 and 17, the pilot would request a to climb to 6,000 ft MSL and 
coordinate the climb up to 9,000 ft MSL and back into R-2515 at waypoint 18. 
2.6.2 Coordinates 
Due to the way Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) were required to be submitted, each waypoint required a 
Very High Frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range (VOR)/distance measuring equipment (DME) associated 
with it. Details on the waypoint, name, coordinates (latitude/longitude), VOR/DME, fix, altitude of the 
route of flight are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Demo Route of Flight Coordinates, Fixes, and Altitudes. 
 
2.6.3 Mission Profile 
Figure 14 shows the mission profile, which includes the transition points of altitudes, classes of airspace, 
and ARTCCs. 
 
Figure 14. Demo Mission Profile. 
2.6.4 Lost Link 
Although the mission routing changed through the lifetime of the project, the concept behind the lost link 
mission stayed the same. If Ikhana lost link, the lost link mission profile would follow a very similar, 
predictable path to the mission profile, and fly back into R-2508 and R-2515. Once back in R-2515, the 
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aircraft would fly a “hexagon” pattern around a set of waypoints until the team could determine the 
appropriate course of action. The original plan by the IT&E team was to follow the mission route back as 
the lost link mission; about 3 lost link routes – however, the FAA deemed it better to break up the lost link 
routes into smaller sections, with a shorter route back into R-2508. Once the new and additional lost link 
missions from the FAA were provided, NASA reviewed and updated these routes to ensure the stricter 
AFRC agency range safety “keep out” over-fly zones were incorporated into these routes (red/yellow areas 
in Figure 15). 
The lost link mission was divided into five separate lost link missions, based on flight segment. The lost 
link missions was continually updated by the pilot during flight with the entry waypoint, altitude, and 
correct mission number. Additionally, each of the lost link missions’ entry waypoints was kept greater 
than 5 minutes of the current position. Figure 15 shows the five segments laid out on top of one another, 
following the mission route. All lost link missions were entered with the current assigned altitude, 
excluding the last six “hexagon” waypoints, which were programmed at 7,500 ft MSL.  
 
Figure 15. Full Lost Link Missions Route. 
The first lost link mission, shown in Figure 16, would cause the aircraft to enter at CHADS R-2508 point 
(labeled and shown as the kink at the top of the lost link route), and then to the last six waypoints (labeled 
and depicted in cyan in Figure 15). This lost link would be used prior to and including waypoint 4. 
The second lost link mission, in Figure 17, would be loaded by the Ikhana pilot slightly prior to waypoint 
4. This lost link mission would cause the aircraft to circle around to the north, following the mission 
routing, back to waypoint 2, and finally re-enter R-2515 and to the last six waypoints. 
Last Six 
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Figure 18 shows the third lost link mission, which would be loaded prior to waypoint 9. The mission would 
be followed to waypoint 10, and then waypoint 1, re-entering R-2515 to the last six waypoints. 
The fourth lost link mission, in Figure 19, would be executed slightly prior to reaching waypoint 9. The 
mission would reach waypoint 12 and then re-enter R-2515 at waypoint 18 to the last six waypoints. 
Finally, Figure 20 shows the fifth lost link mission. This mission would be loaded slightly prior to waypoint 
11, follow the VCV box pattern, and re-enter R-2515 at waypoint 18 and then to the last six waypoints. 
 
Figure 16. Lost Link Route 1. 
CHADS 
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Figure 17. Lost Link Route 2. 
 
Figure 18. Lost Link Route 3. 
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Figure 19. Lost Link Route 4. 
 
Figure 20. Lost Link Route 5. 
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2.7 Methodology 
To perform all phases of flight successfully, the team put together a methodology for each flight segment 
prior to commencing. The system checkout methodology was unique and developed through the years of 
flight testing with the UAS-NAS project. The methodology prior to demonstration flights included 
requirements from the FAA for flights into the NAS. 
2.7.1 System Checkout 
The SCO methodology was unique for this portion of flights. Encounters from previous flight tests were 
slightly modified to encompass a variety of scenarios, while also incorporating unique operational 
encounters which had not been previously performed. The overall objective was to demonstrate 
situations which could be expected while flying in the NAS in any class of airspace. 
 Encounter Nomenclature / Geometries 
In order to meet the SCO objectives, encounters were designed to stress the system. A unique 
nomenclature shown in Table 6 below was also created to easily identify each encounter. 
Table 6. No Chase COA System Checkout Nomenclature. 
Name Definition 
TM Test Mode 
UC Use Case 
SQK Squawk Off 
LOB Level-Off Blunder 
HS High Speed 
NUIS Nuisance 
DB Double Blunder 
HDR High Descent Rate 
IOT Intruder Overtake 
OOT Ownship Overtake 
LT Left Turn 
ATCAS Auto TCAS 
LALT Low Altitude 
OTD Ownship Turn and Descend 
 
Figure 21 through Figure 33 show the encounters that were performed during the SCO. 
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Figure 21. Test Mode Encounter. The DAA system test mode would be set to 253, which forced the 
system to drop fused targets. 
 
Figure 22. Radar Only Encounter. In order to simulate non-cooperative targets, the radar would be the 
only active sensor feeding the DAA algorithms. The intruder aircraft would turn their transponder off in 
this encounter. 
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Figure 23. Testing Ikhana while only having Ku as the C2 Link. 
 
Figure 24. CONOPS for Use Case 2. The Ikhana pilot would employ the DAA system and interact with ATC 
to fulfill the “See and Avoid” responsibilities. 
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Figure 25. Intruder Level-Off Blunder. 
 
Figure 26. Overtaking Intruder. This encounter would be used to represent an encounter that may occur 
in the NAS due to the slower speed of Ikhana. 
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Figure 27. Intruder High Descent Rate. 
 
Figure 28. Ownship Overtake. This encounter represented Ikhana overtaking a slower general aviation 
aircraft. 
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Figure 29. Left Turn Blunder Maneuver. 
 
Figure 30. Double Blunder Maneuver. 
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Figure 31. Increased TCAS Alerts Triggering an Auto Maneuver. 
 
Figure 32. Low Altitude. This encounter was used to simulate flying into Class D airspace to demonstrate 
TCAS/radar performance at a low altitude. 
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Figure 33. Ikhana Turn and Descend. 
 Flight Test Matrix 
A detailed flight test matrix was built for the NCC SCO encounters based on the objectives and 
requirements described in Section 2.7.1.1. The encounters were grouped into sections based on their 
type.  
Because the use of this matrix was highly successful in previous flight campaigns, it was used again for 
SCO. The purpose of the matrix was to input all required test geometries, planned coordinates, and 
populate the flight cards with information and requirements/objectives for each encounter.  
The matrix was built in Microsoft Excel® and used Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) for calculated 
pertinent values, such as Global Position System (GPS) Coordinates in multiple formats. Additionally, Excel 
was useful for calculated Initial Point (IP) to Maneuver Point (MP) and CPA using dead-reckoning 
equations. 
? Scenario (Encounter) Number (S/N): The Scenario Number was the most critical number for each 
encounter. This number served as an identification number for the unique geometry. 
? Type: The type of encounter is based off the geometry and specific objective. 
? Name: Names were based from the type of the encounter. The Name was a quick reference to 
gain Situational Awareness (SA) on what type of encounter was being performed. 
? OWN True Course: True Course of the ownship. This value was used to calculate GPS coordinates 
(magnetic course was later calculated in a separate table). 
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? Leg Time: This is a partial time of the encounter. It could be between a Commence Exercise 
(COMEX) and first CPA. 
? Total Encounter Length: Time for the encounter from COMEX to finish. Most encounters were 2 
or 3 minutes. 
? Ownship Angle: Angle of ownship turn for ownship maneuvering encounters. 
? Angle Into: Relative angle of the intruder into the ownship for that geometry. This value was used 
to calculate GPS coordinates. 
? Vertical Offset: Smallest vertical separation between ownship and the intruder at CPA. If the 
vertical separation necessary for an encounter was ≤500 ft, a lateral offset was required for safety. 
? Lateral Offset: A lateral offset of 0.4 nmi (~2,400 ft) was calculated into the geometry for 
encounters with a vertical separation of ≤500 ft. This was to ensure that if visual was not acquired 
according to mission rule, there would still be a safety buffer. 
? GS OWN: Groundspeed of the ownship. Groundspeed was preferred for calculations since aircraft 
were required to be at a certain set of coordinates at a certain time.  
? GS INT1: Most encounters required the intruder to fly at 150 or 180 KGS. For high-speed 
encounters, intruders were required to fly ≥300 KGS. For low-speed encounters, usually 100 KGS 
was used. 
? Altitude Regime: At various altitude regimes, a different vertical separation between aircraft is 
required for TCAS to trigger. Since some encounters were testing for TCAS interoperability, it was 
critical to note and design the encounter at the proper altitude. 
? Ownship Initial Altitude: Altitudes chosen for each encounter took Ikhana and intruder flight 
performance into consideration, as well as airspace. Encounters began 10k-20k ft MSL or under 
10k ft MSL. Low-altitude radar encounters took the highest point on the terrain (3,200 ft MSL) 
and added 1,000 ft for the flight level (thus 4,200 ft MSL). 
? Ownship Vertical Velocity: For some encounters, a climb or descent was required by the ownship. 
Most common rates required were either 1,000 fpm (climb) or -1,000 fpm (descent).  
? Ownship Final Altitude: Once more, the final altitude was within the block of 10k-20k ft MSL, 
under 10k ft MSL, or 1,000 ft above the highest terrain point. 
? Intruder 1 Initial Altitude: Identical to ownship. 
? Intruder 1 Vertical Velocity: Identical to ownship, although in some cases a high climb/descent 
rate up to 3,000 fpm was required. 
? Intruder 1 Final Altitude: Identical to ownship. 
? CPA OWN: The CPA of the ownship was one of its most important parameters. The CPA was the 
point where the ownship and intruder would be nearest in space for each encounter. CPAs were 
chosen to accommodate for the legs in the airspace, planned for sun angles for manned intruders, 
and were used to build the Ikhana Lost Link mission. Additionally, the CPAs made it easier to group 
encounters based on matching CPA when building these geometries in Zeus SA display in the 
MCC3. Finally, the CPAs were used in a lookup table to build GPS coordinates for all geometries. 
? CPA OWN Lat/Lon: Chosen latitude and longitude for each CPA in Decimal Degrees (DD) format. 
The CPA latitude/longitude was found using FalconView. 
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? IP OWN: The IP of the ownship was chosen to fit within the airspace and to accommodate for the 
encounter lengths. The IP served as the point where the encounter would start and where the 
aircraft needed to be at the COMEX. Each IP had an identification number based on its 
coordinates, and for encounters that used the same IP, an identical IP ID was used. The IP was 
also used on the flight cards for reference on the top view. 
? IP OWN Lat/Lon: Calculated latitude and longitude of the ownship IP from the CPA using dead 
reckoning equations, in DD format. 
? IP OWN DME: Calculated distance in nmi from the CPA to the IP for ownship. 
? IP INT: The same procedure was used for intruder IP as for ownship. 
? IP INT Lat/Lon: Calculated latitude and longitude of the initial point for intruder from the CPA in 
DD format. 
? IP INT DME: Calculated distance in nmi from the CPA to the IP for intruder. 
? CPA INT: Similar to the ownship, the CPAs for the intruder were also grouped based on GPS 
coordinates. However, since the geometries for the intruders were built around those for the 
ownship, there were many more CPAs for intruders than for the ownship (due to various angles 
into, groundspeeds, etc.). 
? CPA INT Lat/Lon: Calculated latitude and longitude of the intruder CPA in DD. The CPA for the 
intruder was either the same as the ownship (˃500 ft vertical separation) or calculated to be 2,400 
ft away (≤500 ft vertical separation) from ownship CPA using the relative angle into. 
? MP INT: For some encounters, a maneuver was required in the middle of the encounter for the 
ownship or intruder to create a “blunder” type scenario. Maneuver points once again held the 
same ID if they had the same GPS coordinates. 
? MP INT Lat/Lon: Calculated latitude and longitude in DD that the intruder was expected to begin 
their standard rate turn to the CPA. 
? On Condition: Each encounter required that the aircraft be on condition a certain number of 
seconds from CPA. This was to ensure that the algorithm would have enough time to pick up the 
aircraft in the encounter for their required conditions (speeds, altitudes, vertical speed, etc.).  
? Tolerance: This value was determined from simulation by the researchers or from previous 
experience. As time went on, it became apparent that tolerance was not as critical for SCO 
(especially for non-maneuvering encounters) as much as maintaining stable conditions. 
? Ikhana Lost Link: In the case that Ikhana would lose link, a Lost Link mission was programmed into 
its flight computer. The Lost Link mission was based on the CPA the ownship would be heading to 
for that encounter. For this reason, it was critical for the Ikhana team to have all CPAs prior to 
flight testing so they could build this mission. The Lost Link mission was input in the flight matrix 
using a lookup table based on CPA. 
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Table 7. Summarized No Chase COA System Checkout Matrix. 
 
 Flight Cards 
Flight cards were developed based on cards created during FT3, FT4, and ACAS Xu FT2, which in turn were 
based on cards for ACAS Xu SS flight program by personnel from Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Lincoln Laboratory. These flight cards were used for similar types of encounters during that flight 
test.  
Due to the successful use of these flight cards through various flight campaigns, a similar format was used 
for the NCC SCO. With the collaborative effort of NCC Ikhana Operations, Armstrong IT&E Operations, and 
researcher input, the product was designed to provide a simple, easy-to-use, and easily modifiable card 
that met the requirements for mission success. The cards also presented a familiar format to that of an 
instrument approach plate which enabled the aircrew to quickly determine test parameters and critical 
flight information. 
Flight cards were built in Excel and were directly linked to the flight test matrix. The matrix had the 
capability of auto-populating much of the information for the card based on look-up tables from the 
scenario number: IP/CPA names and coordinates, altitudes, headings, distances, groundspeeds, lost link 
mission for Ikhana, on-condition timing, CPA tolerances, sensor selection, deconfliction altitudes, notes, 
and abort procedures. Manual input was required for the images, although this was simplified to a single 
button to input all views. 
The cards were designed to fit on an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper, with one half dedicated to ownship and 
the other to intruder. This allowed users to either cut the deck in half or fold their card to the one of 
interest.  
There were over 26 flight cards for the NCC SCO, each with unique properties and characteristics from 
each encounter. Pictured below in Figure 34 is an example ownship flight card that was used. Figure 35 
show an intruder flight card for the same encounter. Each flight card had its own spreadsheet and the 
2 3 4 7 9 11 13 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 27 28 29 30 031
PE Name/Type
Priority (1-
high, 2-
medium, 3-
Name
Leg Time 
(min)
Angle 
Into Int 1
Vertical 
Offset Int 
1 (ft)
Lateral 
Offset 
INT1 (ft)
GS OWN GS INT1
Altitude 
Regime
Ownship 
Initial 
Altitude
Ownship 
Vertical 
Velocity
Ownship 
Final 
Altitude
Ownship 
Abort Alt
Intruder 
1 Initial 
Altitude
Intruder 
1 Vertical 
Velocity
Intruder 
1 Final 
Altitude
Intruder 
1 Abort 
Alt
Intruder 
1 Abort 
Hdng
3 HS-11 2.0 0 500 0 180 300 <10K MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8500 0 8500 8000 123
3 HS-12 2.0 0 500 0 180 300 <10K MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8500 0 8500 8000 123
1 SQK-6 2.0 0 300 0 120 150 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8700 0 8700 8000 348
1 SQK-7 2.0 45 300 0 120 150 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8700 0 8700 8000 258
1 SQK-8 2.0 90 300 0 120 150 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8700 0 8700 8000 213
3 ATCAS-22 1.0 0 300 2430 150 210 >10K MSL 21000 0 21000 21000 20700 0 20700 20000 123
3 ATCAS-23 1.0 0 300 2430 150 210 >10K MSL 21000 0 21000 21000 20700 0 20700 20000 123
Test Mode 1 TM-1 2.0 0 300 0 160 180 >10k MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11700 0 11700 11000 348
1 UC-1-NOTUSED 2.0 0 200 0 150 180 >10k MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11800 0 11800 11000 348
1 UC-2 2.0 0 800 0 150 180 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8200 0 8200 8000 348
1 UC-4-NOTUSED 2.0 90 200 0 150 180 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 8800 0 8800 8000 348
1 UC-5-NOTUSED 2.0 0 200 0 150 180 >10k MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11800 0 11800 11000 348
2 IOT-17 3.0 180 300 2430 160 180 >10K MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11700 0 11700 11000 033
2 IOT-18 3.0 180 300 2430 160 180 >10K MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11700 0 11700 11000 033
2 LT-20 3.0 45 300 2430 160 180 >10k MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 12300 0 12300 13000 123
2 LT-21 3.0 90 300 2430 160 180 >10k MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 12300 0 12300 13000 123
Ownship Overtake 2 OOT-19 3.0 180 300 2430 180 160 >10K MSL 12000 0 12000 12000 11700 0 11700 11000 123
High Descent Rate 2 HDR-16 3.0 0 500 2430 160 180 >10K MSL 10500 0 10500 10500 18000 -3000 11000 11500 123
1 LALT-24 3.0 0 200 2430 150 180 3000 AGL 6200 0 6200 6200 6000 0 6000 5200 348
1 LALT-25 3.0 0 200 2430 150 180 3000 AGL 6200 0 6200 6200 6000 0 6000 5200 348
Double Blunder 2 DB-15 2.0 0 500 0 150 180 <10k MSL 7000 1000 9000 9000 12500 -1500 9500 10000 123
3 LOB-9 2.0 0 200 0 150 180 >10k MSL 10000 0 10000 10000 12200 -2000 10200 11000 303
3 LOB-10 2.0 0 500 0 150 180 >10k MSL 10000 0 10000 10000 12200 -2000 10200 11000 303
Ownship Turn & Descend 2 OTD-25 2.0 0 500 2430 150 180 <10k MSL 15000 -1000 13000 13000 12500 0 12500 12000 213
2 NUIS-13 2.0 0 1000 0 150 180 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 12000 -1500 10000 10000 123
2 NUIS-14 2.0 0 500 0 150 180 <10k MSL 9000 0 9000 9000 12000 -1500 9500 10000 123
High Speed
Auto TCAS
Use Case
Intruder Overtake
Left Turn
Low Alt 3k AGL
Level Off Blunder
Nuisance
Squawk Off
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cards were later converted into PDF, packaged into a document for that particular flight day, and 
distributed in soft- and hard-copy form to all NCC SCO participants.  
 
Figure 34. NUIS-13 Flight Card for Ownship. 
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Figure 35. NUIS-13 Flight Card for Intruder. 
 Altimeter Calibration 
An altimeter calibration was required for all SCO encounters where the vertical separation between 
intruders and ownship was less than 500 ft (SCO Mission Rule MRNCC-02, Section 2.10.1.1). The mission 
rule was enforced for all flights.   
The altimeter calibration was designed to take out the standard errors found within the pitot-static 
systems in order to ensure the planned vertical separation was as close to planned as possible. According 
to Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.411 and Appendix E of Part 43 aircraft pitot-static systems must 
be within 75 ft of field elevation when dialed into the local altimeter setting.  Additional errors come with 
changes in altitude and airspeed. Since some of the planned encounters were with a 200 ft vertical 
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separation, it was possible to be much closer with the errors identified above if they were not mitigated 
with the calibration.   
The calibration was conducted at a flight condition that closely approximated all the planned encounters. 
In order to accomplish the calibration, Ikhana acted as the lead aircraft with intruder aircraft joining on 
Ikhana’s wing in close formation. The Ikhana platform set standard 29.92 inHg and the other aircraft 
adjusted their altimeter settings to indicate the same altitude readout. At those conditions each 
participating aircraft observed the difference from Ikhana.   
The altimeter calibration was performed prior to each flight that required it using the flight card shown in 
Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36. SCO Altimeter Calibration Card. 
 Encounter Flow 
Lessons learned from previous flight tests were utilized during the execution of the encounters above. A 
schedule listed below in Table 8 was determined which covered two flight test days. In order to keep the 
aircrew safe, a buildup philosophy was used: e.g., conducting “simpler” geometries first, higher vertical 
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separation to smaller, grouping encounters with the same intruder aircraft, unmitigated to mitigated, and 
advisory to AUTO maneuvers.  
Table 8. Flight Test Buildup Schedule. 
 
2.7.2 Demonstration 
The flights into the NAS were unique in that they were the first time a UAS would fly without a chase 
vehicle into lower altitude Class E and D airspace. In addition to the normal operations with NASA 870 
within R-2508, additional notifications and reports needed to be created. 
Operations within R-2508 required filing local NOTAMs, weather checks, frequency allocations (which 
included Line of Sight (LOS) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Ku-band), receiving ops numbers, 
airspace reports, and airspace coordination. In addition to that, when flying into the NAS, the team was 
required to file an IFR form 175. Per the COA, an additional requirement was satisfied by notifying local 
ATC such as ZLA, ZOA, Joshua, and filing a separate notification with Victorville operations, with 
information relating to: filed flight plan, waypoints with fixes, altitudes, lost link procedures, and flight 
route. In short, two types of NOTAMS were filed: distant NOTAMS for operations within ZLA and ZOA (filed 
with the Flight Service Stations (FSS) per the COA) and local NOTAMS for operations at Edwards and VCV. 
Finally, a requirement of the COA was to submit an operational report through the CAPS system, even if 
a flight did not occur. 
2.8 Mission Planning and Information 
As mentioned previously, the NASA UAS-NAS and Ikhana teams had a history of performing the type of 
flight testing required to check out the system before flights into the NAS, as well as experience in flying 
with a COA.  
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2.8.1 System Checkout 
Executing SCO flights required significant coordination. Flights were planned at a rate of two flights per 
week due to the duration of each sortie and the amount of test cards executed per sortie. Flying the 
encounters was user work load intensive, with about 10 minutes allocated to each encounter, and setup 
required in between runs.  
 
As a pre-requisite to executing flight test, a T-1 crew briefing was accomplished the day prior to the event.  
The T-1 briefing covered, in detail, the following aspects related to the upcoming flight: 
 
? Roll Call 
? Mission Summary 
? Mission Timeline 
? Weather / NOTAMs  
? UAS Status 
? Mission Information  
? GCS Status 
? Airspace / Airfield  
? Support Assets 
? Contingencies 
? Miscellaneous 
? Flight Card Review 
? Lessons Learned 
 
A flight could be delayed or postponed based on information discussed during the T-1 briefing.  All team 
members were required to participate in the briefing either in-person or remotely.     
 
All SCO flights started at 0600 (local) Pacific Time. Subsequently, the morning brief was held at 0415L. The 
morning briefings covered at a higher level the same information with emphasis on any changes from the 
previous T-1 briefing. The intent was for this briefing to be about 15 minutes in length. A final go/no-go 
decision was made at this briefing. After the brief, the team was dismissed to prepare for the flight and in 
some cases additional crew familiarity training was conducted for the DAA system. The MCC3 was staffed 
at approximately 0530L to support any systems troubleshooting or coordination efforts required by the 
supporting aircraft teams.   
 
In general, flights were planned for approximately 5 hours. Part of that flight time was allocated to transit, 
altimeter calibration, and DAA system startup procedures. The limiting factor for Ikhana was frequency 
coordination and typically required an off time of 1200L for both SATCOM and LOS frequencies. For the 
intruders, fuel available was the limiting factor. 
 
A flight debrief was mandatory in order to discuss the day’s flight events, identify any aircraft 
discrepancies, and discuss test inefficiencies which may have decreased the number of encounters and 
test objectives achieved. Action items were assigned for issues and lessons learned which needed to be 
closed out prior to the next flight. A post-flight test card review and high level data analysis was conducted 
as well. If the next flight occurred on the following day, a T-1 was then conducted to review test objectives 
for that next flight, otherwise the T-1, as appropriate, was conducted prior to the next test opportunity. 
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Figure 37 shows the basic timeline previously discussed. Start of test day was typically 0415L and 
completed around 1415L.  
 
 
Figure 37. Typical SCO Timeline. 
2.8.2 Demonstration 
Since the demonstration flights consisted of only two flights, one with chase and one without chase, the 
operations tempo was low in comparison to previous flight test series. The team was only required to 
schedule frequencies and perform the tasks outlined in Section 2.7.2 prior to conducting flights. 
The demonstration flights had a similar timeline as the SCO, with the team conducting T-1 briefing the day 
before flight, and the morning brief T-0 once again beginning at 0415L. Figure 38 shows the typical 
timeline for one of the demonstration flights. Instead of a flight card review, the team would review the 
mission route and discuss the criteria for success for the flights into the NAS. Additionally, the review 
provided contact information of the air control facilities which NASA 870 would utilize.  
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Figure 38. Typical Demo Timeline. 
2.9 Roles and Responsibilities 
During SCO flights, the focus was within the MCC3. The coordination summary can be found in Figure 39. 
For the demonstration flights, the focus left the MCC3, and instead was centralized on the Ikhana GCS. 
The communication structure for this phase is shown in Figure 40. 
2.9.1 System Checkout 
For scripted encounters, the main point of contact was the TC. The TC would be responsible for managing 
the mission execution over voice communication on the mission net (VHF radio) with the Ikhana pilot, 
intruder pilots, and SPORT, the local EAFB air traffic control agency.  The TC was responsible for managing 
the tempo of encounters, watching air safety, and relaying real-time changes or adjustments to the 
aircrew. The Test Director (TD), who sat next to the TC, was the primary liaison with the TC. The TD would 
listen to the back channels, such as the engineering channels, and communicate whether flight cards 
needed to be repeated or adjusted, as well as other issues that may arise. Additionally, the TD would also 
maintain the air picture SA and support the TC, and communicate with the SOR, local agencies, and non-
local agencies as required. The third role in the MCC3 was the Test Coordinator (TCOR), whose main duties 
were to be a scribe for the flights, keeping track of when encounters were executed, the quality of the 
results, the quality of the encounter itself, redlines, airspace changes, and other pertinent information 
that could be used during the debrief and improve later flights operations. 
During all flights a Senior Operations Representative (SOR) was required to be present in the MCC3 (SCO) 
or the GCS (Demo). The SOR acted as a spokesperson for the NASA AFRC Director of Flight Operations and 
their responsibility was to monitor general conduct of the flight test operations, monitor the team’s real-
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time decisions, and initiate the Aircraft Incident Response Procedure (DCP-S-001) in the case of an aircraft 
mishap.  
The pilots, along with managing their aircraft and aviating safely, were responsible for being at the set 
location on the card on time and on condition, adhering to all mission rules. 
Within the GCS, the Mission Director (MD) communicated directly with co-located pilots within GCS, TD, 
and other agencies (as required). The MD was responsible for overall health of the aircraft, ensuring the 
aircraft was in the correct configuration for the current flight card, and also maintaining SA for conducting 
flight of Ikhana within the airspace. 
The LVC team communicated directly with the TD on the test team net and provide real-time discussions 
on the DAA display performance. The LVC lab was also where the data was being recorded. 
Finally, the Range Control Officer (RCO) was responsible for monitoring and making coordination calls 
with AFRC communication and the AFRC test range mission systems operations representatives. 
 
Figure 39. Coordination Summary for SCO. 
2.9.2 Demonstration 
Since the demonstration flights’ goal was to show how a UAS can file and fly like any piloted vehicle, the 
operation was focused on the Ikhana pilot conducting a flight with the team in the GCS to support. All 
primary VHF communication occurred between the Ikhana pilot and ATC, with chase (when required for 
the first flight) checking in on the same net as “two”. For this reason, too, the SOR was located in the GCS 
for the demonstration flights. 
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The MCC3 acted as a backup to these flights and received a VHF relay, or “mirror”, of the communications 
that the Ikhana pilot was receiving. The TC and TD provided backup support and could communicate with 
industry partners, the LVC, RCO, or other local agencies for support. 
 
Figure 40. Coordination Summary for Demo Flight. 
2.10 Safety, Mission Rules, and Contingencies 
All operations were conducted in accordance with NASA AFRC safety policies AFOP-8715.3-005, Hazard 
Management Procedure, and AFOP-8715.3-007, System Safety Support.   
For NCC hazard analysis, the SSWGs took into consideration: 
? Encounter geometries (SCO) 
? The different equipped aircraft that may be encountered (SCO, Demo) 
? The results from the FAA SRMP (Demo) 
? The different classes airspace (Demo) 
In order to maintain approved levels of safety, which are paramount to flight test operations, mission 
rules were developed and were associated with the project specific Hazard Reports. All encounters and 
configurations were concurred with by the safety representative. All Hazard Reports were presented to 
the NASA AFRC Tech Brief board for each phase of the project (SCO, Demo, etc.). The signed Hazard 
Reports were kept by the Systems Safety Engineer and copies were stored electronically in the Project’s 
files. 
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Additionally, a range safety analysis was conducted by the NASA range safety team. For both the system 
checkout and demonstration (after route modifications) the range safety analysis was within acceptable 
limits for NASA Armstrong. 
2.10.1 System Checkout 
Due to the unique nature of some of the encounters planned for SCO, the hazards and mission rules were 
vetted through an SSWG with the entire team, which included the IT&E, the Ikhana team, GA-ASI, and 
Honeywell. These Mission Rules, Go/No-Go’s, Contingencies, and Mitigations were based off previous 
flight tests and had a pedigree, from all previous missions. 
 Mission Rules 
The Mission Rules for SCO can be found in Table 9. These Mission Rules were based on previous flight 
tests and held a pedigree, from all previous flights. During a Mission Rules WG (a part of the OWG), 
MRNCC-08 was evaluated and was able to be removed for the SCO flights as it is covered under MRNCC-
07. IT&E Operations Engineering ensured that each of the Mitigations referenced in each Rule had been 
satisfied. 
Table 9. SCO Mission Rules. 
Rule # Rule Description Rationale / Hazard Report Notes 
Responsible 
Position 
MRNCC-
01A 
The test conductor shall control the setup, 
timing and progression of the planned 
encounters at all times, including between 
encounters. 
NCC-21 Mitigation 3  TC 
MRNCC-
01 
Systems under test shall not be used as the 
primary method to maintain safe 
separation of aircraft.   
NCC-16 Basic Hazard   All 
MRNCC-
02 
Test runs will be aborted if intruder aircraft 
do not have visual on all aircraft within 1 
nmi (2 nmi for high speed) lateral and less 
than 500’ vertical separation, except when 
aircraft are diverging. During altimeter 
calibration, the intruder aircraft has visual 
responsibility for both aircraft. 
NCC-01 Mitigation 8 
NCC-06A Mitigation 3  
NCC-06A Mitigation 17 
NCC-03 Mitigation 7 
NCC-16 Mitigation 4 
Airspeed, 
heading, 
altitude 
divergence, 
etc. 
Ikhana 
Overtaking 
TC, PICs 
MRNCC-
03 
Intruder aircraft will only follow TCAS RA 
guidance if following test card direction or 
they have reason to believe the alert is 
caused by non-participating aircraft AND 
have SA on all participating aircraft.  
NCC-06A Mitigation 3 
NCC-06A Mitigation 5 
NCC-06A Mitigation 19 
TCAS II 
equipped 
intruders 
only 
Intruder PIC 
MRNCC-
04 
Update of the appropriate Ikhana Lost Link 
Mission variables will be verified, by 
aircrew and the Mission Director prior to 
commencing each test run.   
NCC-03 Mitigation 3 
NCC-03 Mitigation 8 
Lost link 
entry point 
identified on 
MD/PIC 
  
 
48 
UAS-NAS NASA 870 Ikhana No Chase COA (NCC) Flights: Flight Test Report, August 2018 – Rev. A 
each test 
card.  
MRNCC-
05 
Flight operations outside of the approved 
mission flight envelope for Ikhana are 
prohibited. 
NCC-14 Mitigation 8   MD/PIC 
MRNCC-
06 
Abort the encounter for the following 
reasons (but not limited to): loss of 
situational awareness, task saturation, 
Ikhana lost link, DAA system failure, 
emergency condition, or mission rule 
violation. 
NCC-01 Mitigation 3 
NCC-01 Mitigation 4 
NCC-17 Mitigation 1 
NCC-17 Mitigation 3 
 TC, PICs, MD 
MRNCC-
07 
When not on a test run, Ikhana crew will 
ensure "Maneuver Mode" is selected to 
ADVISORY or OFF. 
NCC-07 Mitigation 5 
NCC-21 Mitigation 08   MD, SO 
MRNCC-
08 
During test runs below 7000’ MSL, 
"Maneuver Mode" shall be selected to 
ADVISORY or OFF by Ikhana crew. 
Recommend removing 
this rule (reference 
MR-7) or changing to 
5000’ MSL? 
 Review for 
SCO, AGL MD, SO 
MRNCC-
09 
During auto TCAS runs, the test run will be 
aborted if Ikhana begins an automatic 
maneuver contrary to the test card 
instructions. 
From ACAS Xu Results 
NCC-01 Derived 
NCC-06A Mitigation 20 
 TC, PIC, MD 
MRNCC-
10 
All participants will ensure their navigation 
quality error does not exceed 0.1 nmi for 
runs with less than 500’ vertical separation. 
NCC-01 Mitigation 6 
NCC-06A Mitigation 2 
NCC-01 Basic HR 
 MD/ Intruder PIC 
MRNCC-
11 
Confirm each participant's time 
management tools match the time hack 
made prior to starting encounters. 
Standard Practice 
NCC-01 Mitigation 1 
NCC-01 Mitigation 6 
NCC-01 Mitigation 9 
NCC-01 Mitigation 10 
 TC, PICs 
MRNCC-
12 
During encounters when within 1 nmi, 
maintain at least 150' vertical separation of 
other aircraft's planned altitude. 
Standard Practice 
Mission Success 
NCC-01 Derived 
 Intruder PIC 
MRNCC-
13 
Test runs will be conducted with the 
following environmental criteria: 
- 3 or greater statute miles visibility  
- Clear of clouds 1000' above and below the 
planned test block including abort 
maneuvers 
Ikhana Standard 
Mission Rules 
NCC-21 Mitigation 5 
 MD/TC, PICs 
MRNCC-
14 
Between test runs, all participating aircraft 
shall establish and maintain deconfliction 
altitude from previous encounter until 
directed by the TC. 
NCC-21 Mitigation 6 
NCC-17 Mitigation 4 
Standard practice / 
Test Plan 
 TC, PICs 
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MRNCC-
15 
All participating aircraft will conduct an 
altimeter calibration using Ikhana as the 
baseline prior to executing encounters with 
less than 500' planned vertical separation. 
Aircraft will maintain altitude and/or lateral 
separation until visual acquisition is 
confirmed. 
NCC-01 Mitigation 5 Per flight day TC, PICs 
 
 Go / No-Go 
In addition to the mission rules, prior to executing a mission, a set of “Go/No-Go” criteria were required 
to be met in order to begin flights. For SCO, these can be found in Table 10. 
Table 10. SCO Go / No-Go. 
 
Rule Description Rationale  Notes 
1 
Strobe/anti-collision lights – FUNCTIONAL Ikhana Standard Go/No-Go Criteria  In accordance 
with MEL or 
applicable Flight 
Manual 
requirements  
Position/Nav lights – FUNCTIONAL Ikhana Standard Go/No-Go Criteria  
Planned transponder equipment – 
OPERATIONAL Mission Requirement (DAA System) 
2 All redundant flight control systems – FUNCTIONAL Ikhana Standard Go/No-Go Criteria  
In accordance 
with MEL or 
applicable Flight 
Manual 
requirements  
3 Two VHF radios  – FUNCTIONAL Mission Requirement (Test and Airspace Requirements) 
Required for ATC 
and TC 
coordination 
TG-14 capable of 
monitoring 2 VHF 
freqs 
4 
If the GCS/SMURF configuration is single 
string fiber optics (no redundant fiber 
optics) then a GCS/PGDT or GCS/GDT LOS 
lakebed runway must be available for an 
emergency landing. 
A GDT or PGDT directly connected to 
the GCS is the emergency procedure 
in the event of fiber optic system 
failure. 
Ikhana Standard 
Go/No-Go 
Criteria  
5 
Zeus display – FUNCTIONAL 
Ikhana encounters are limited to 500 ft 
vertical separation with visual required 
when MCC3 Zeus is not available    
Mission Requirement (Test 
Command & Control)  
NCC-01 Mitigation 7 
NCC-06A Mitigation 4 
NCC-07 Mitigation 2 
NCC-17 Mitigation 8 
MCC3 only. 
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6 Ku SATCOM or DLOS link – Available/READY 
Mission Requirement (Primary link 
for DAA System) 
NCC-03 Basic HR 
Required for 
Ikhana  
8 Situation awareness display – FUNCTIONAL Mission Requirement NCC-01 Mitigation 7 As equipped 
9 Navigation system and time management tools – FUNCTIONAL 
Mission Requirement (DAA System) 
NCC-01 Mitigation 6 
NCC-01 Mitigation 7 
As equipped  
10 Barometric Altimeter – FUNCTIONAL and Meets Maintenance Standards 
NCC-01 Mitigation 5 
NCC-06A Mitigation 2 
  
11 Intruder TSPI truth source – FUNCTIONAL Test plan  
 
2.10.2 Demonstration 
Because the flights into the NAS were new to the test team as a whole, a new set of Mission Rules were 
created. These Mission Rules, like the SCO set, were vetted by the entire test team and through the SSWG 
to ensure that all hazards were being covered, as a part of the AFRC safety process. Since this was to be 
treated as a “routine” flight into the NAS, the Ikhana team followed its own project specific set of Go/No-
Go’s criteria, established for their normal flight operations. 
 Mission Rules 
The Mission Rules for the demonstration flights into the NAS can be found in Table 11. Since the team 
would be relying on the DAA system, command and control, and SA to operate safely with other vehicles 
in the NAS, the rules focused mainly on these areas. Rules 1, 3, 6 focused on the DAA system and SA, and 
rules 2, 4, and 7 focused on the command and control of the airplane. 
Table 11. Demo Mission Rules. 
Rule # Rule Description Rationale / Hazard Report Notes 
Responsible
Position 
MRNCC-
01 
Zeus display will be functional before 
leaving R-2515. 
Mission Requirement 
(Test Command & 
Control)  
NCC-06 Mitigation 2 
NCC-07 Mitigation 2 
NCC-06 Mitigation 13 
NCC-07 Mitigation 13 
NCC-17 Mitigation 8 
GCS only 
If Zeus is lost 
outside R-2515 it 
does not 
constitute a RTB. 
Zeus provides 
additional SA. 
MD/PIC 
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MRNCC-
02 
Ku SATCOM and DLOS link will be 
available and ready. 
Mission Requirement 
(Primary link for DAA 
System) 
NCC-38 Basic HR 
NCC-39 Basic HR 
This mission rule 
applies prior to 
leaving R-2515 
PIC/MD 
MRNCC-
03 
At pilot’s discretion, any DAA system 
anomaly that results in degraded 
situational awareness will be cause for 
RTB. 
Mission Requirement 
NCC-06 Basic 
NCC-17 Basic 
Not applicable 
with chase PIC/MD 
MRNCC-
04 
Update of the appropriate Ikhana Lost 
Link Mission variables will be verified, by 
aircrew and the Mission Director prior to 
each flight segment.   
NCC-38 Mitigation #4 
NCC-38 Mitigation #4 
NCC-38 Mitigation #2 
NCC-39 Mitigation #2 
 PIC/MD 
MRNCC-
05 
Flight operations outside of the approved 
mission flight envelope for Ikhana are 
prohibited. 
NCC-14 Mitigation 8 DAA OML configuration MD/PIC 
MRNCC-
06 Operate in Day, VMC.  
Ikhana Standard 
Mission Rules 
NCC-06 Mitigation 18 
NCC-07 Mitigation 18 
14 CFR 91.155 MD, PICs 
MRNCC-
07 In the case of a degraded C2 link, RTB. 
NCC-38 Basic 
NCC-39 Basic Pilot’s discretion  PIC 
MRNCC-
08 
Except when in Class D, the minimum 
altitude is 3000 ft AGL. 
DAA radar fidelity 
limitation 
 PIC 
 
 Demonstration Mission Contingencies 
For all phases of flight, with chase and without chase, the team put together contingencies in case of 
losing voice communication and general mission contingencies. These procedures were separate from the 
aircraft emergency procedures, which all aircraft are required to adhere to, since they were unique to the 
operational environment. The procedures were easy to read, use, and were placed in the GCS and MCC3. 
2.10.2.2.1 Demo Contingency Voice Comm (With Chase) 
First, the team created communication contingencies when flying with chase. These procedures, shown 
in Table 12, show a variety of contingency scenarios which include: NASA 870 losing radio, the DAA system 
not functioning, a combination of the DAA system not functioning and NASA 870 losing radio, NASA 870 
going lost link (which assumes no radio), chase aircraft losing radio, both NASA 870 and the chase vehicle 
losing radio, and finally, NASA 870 going lost link and chase losing radio concurrently. 
The assumptions for this set of contingencies were that NASA 870 would act as the lead aircraft, chase 
would check in periodically (approximately every 30 minutes) on ATC frequency, the lost link routing was 
specific and defined by the COA, and the SOR as well as a Project Manager (PM) resided in the GCS. 
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Table 12. Demo Contingency Voice Comm (With Chase). 
 
2.10.2.2.2  Demo Contingency Voice Comm (Without Chase) 
The second set of contingency scenarios were designed for the flight without chase and are displayed in 
Table 13. This table was simpler than the procedures for flight with chase since the activity only included 
NASA 870. Contingency scenarios included: NASA 870 losing radio, DAA system not functioning, the 
combination of DAA system being down and NASA 870 losing radio, and NASA 870 going into its lost link. 
The assumptions for this flight were that the COA defines the lost link procedures and that the SOR and 
PM are in the GCS. 
Table 13. Demo Contingency Voice Comm (Without Chase). 
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2.10.2.2.3 Mission Contingencies 
In addition to the lost communication and normal emergency procedures, the team created a set of 
contingency procedures unique to the mission. These procedures, shown in Table 14, were once more 
vetted with the entire team through OWGs and SSWGs, and a copy was placed within each of the control 
rooms.  
The procedures in this table included the chase vehicle going blind (losing visual on NASA 870), the chase 
vehicle having an in-flight emergency (IFE), NASA 870 experiencing an IFE, NASA 870 not being able to 
return to base (RTB) and no longer being in control, NASA 870 not being able to RTB but with control, 
Edwards runways closed, GCS becoming inoperable, and a serious atmospheric event affecting the flight. 
Assumptions for this table were similar to the voice communication table: NASA 870 would act as the lead 
aircraft, chase would check in periodically (approximately every 30 minutes) on ATC frequency, the lost 
link routing was specific and defined by the COA, and the SOR as well as a PM would reside in the GCS. 
When flying without chase, chase steps or columns would simply be omitted from this table. 
Table 14. Demo Mission Contingencies. 
 
2.11 Training and Qualifications 
Due to the unique nature of both Scripted Encounters and the demonstration flights, a training plan was 
required to be put into place, as it related to specific portions of each mission. Any personnel in training 
had a qualified individual providing the training. All flight crew team members, including for SCO and the 
demonstration, were qualified for their position in accordance with AFRC requirements.  
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Aircrew were required to be current and qualified per organization requirements (AFRC Pilot’s Office), 
attend or be represented on tabletop training days (described below), and receive test specific training 
(DAA) prior to performing encounters. 
A training event, or tabletop, was conducted prior to both the SCO and the demonstration flights. 
Representatives from all aircraft, DAA stakeholders, and IT&E operations were present. At the completion 
of this training event all stakeholders and aircrew were considered prepared and ready to support the 
SCO and demonstration events in the planned airspace, by all oversight organizations. 
Additionally, DAA specific training was conducted by the CPDS SME prior to flights. 
2.11.1 System Checkout Tabletop 
The system checkout training was based off the training plans that were put in place for previous UAS-
NAS flight test campaigns. Given the experience of the test team, the tabletop was conducted as a 
refresher of flying encounters within R-2515. This training included: 
Admin / Motherhood 
? Introductions (Roll Call) 
? International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
? Required Training 
? NCC SCO CONOPS 
? Staffing 
? Required Aircraft 
? Schedule 
? Ops Planning 
Test Admin / Specifics 
? Roles and Responsibilities 
? Safety 
? Mission Rules / Go / No-Go 
? Airspace Brief 
? Comm Plan 
? Motherhood / Contingencies / Aborts / Lost Link 
? Timeline (Test Day / Test Encounter) 
? Project Pilot Comments 
? Altimeter Calibration 
? Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
? Objectives / Success Criteria 
? Brief / Debrief Plan 
? Weather 
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Test Execution 
? Test Card / Geometries Review 
? CPDS User Interface Briefing 
2.11.2 Demonstration Tabletop 
Since the demonstration was unique, the training had to be tailored to the route outside of the NAS and 
studying the COA. Elements were similar to SCO but included these new talking points, especially in the 
test admin and review sections. The pilots had a greater role in conducting the training, since the mission 
was to simulate a file-and-fly scenario with a UAS. 
Admin / Motherhood 
? Introductions (Roll Call) 
? ITAR 
? Required Training 
? NCC Demo CONOPS 
? Staffing 
? Required Aircraft 
? Schedule 
? Ops Planning 
Test Admin / Specifics 
? Roles and Responsibilities 
? R-2508 Complex Brief 
? NCC Route Overview 
? Lost Link Planning 
? Comm Plan 
? Mission Rules / Go / No-Go 
? Motherhood / Contingencies / Aborts / Lost Link 
? Safety 
? Project Pilot Comments 
? Objectives / Success Criteria 
? COA Talking Points 
? Brief / Debrief Plan 
? Day of Timeline 
? Weather 
NCC Review 
? Lessons Learned from SCO#3 Review 
? CPDS User Interface Briefing 
? Contacts 
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2.11.3 Detect and Avoid Display Training 
The aircrew team assigned to conduct the SCO and demonstration flights had used the CPDS DAA 
technology for many previous flight tests, including FT3, FT4, and ACAS Xu FT2. Because of this, they were 
very experienced with the system and its characteristics, providing continuity for these flights. 
A DAA refresher display training was conducted closer to the actual flight dates. Although most DAA 
training was conducted at the tabletop, due to aircrew availability and SME availability, some training was 
conducted as a supplement meeting. This training was used to inform the aircrew who would be executing 
the flights what the SME was expecting from them. The following questions were addressed during these 
exchanges: 
? Test configuration. What does the SME/Researcher want; ON, OFF or de-energized? 
? Maneuver type. Maneuvering (mitigated) or non-maneuvering (unmitigated).  
? Guidance type. Will the DAA system provide directive or descriptive guidance?  
? Display under test familiarity. What display will the aircrew be using to gain SA and make a 
maneuver decision?   
? Miscellaneous expectations.  Is there anything specific to CPDS (updates, etc.) that the aircrew 
need to know?  
Representations of the CPDS screen in both picture format as well as a replay of previous simulated events 
were presented to the crew. Using the lessons learned from previous flight test campaigns, more 
efficiencies were gained by the test team and better data collected during the SCO. The flight crew better 
understood the DAA system and expectations on its use during flight. Additionally, playback from the SCO 
flights was provided to the aircrew. 
With the years of experience, DAA system training, and SME involvement, the crew was ready and capable 
of flying into the NAS using this system. 
2.11.4 Control Room Training 
Personnel in all control rooms were required to have formal training in their position or workstation. 
For the MCC3 control room, the TC and TD were required to obtain a formal approval from the NASA 
Armstrong Director of Flight Operations in order to serve in that capacity.  The requirements for the test 
conductor were derived from NASA Armstrong AFPL-7900.3-001, Mission Control Qualification & Training 
Plan. The requirements were tailored from the mission controller section. For these flights, two test 
conductors and three test directors were qualified. 
Within the Ikhana GCS, a MD was also qualified, per the Mission Control Qualification & Training Plan, to 
serve that role. These flights included two qualified MDs. The Ikhana GCS also had one Systems Operator 
qualified. 
Within the LVC, all personnel required were trained for their respective work station. 
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2.11.5 ATC Training 
Outside entities also conducted training pertaining to the NCC flights. Worth mentioning, the FAA 
requested that their ATC controllers received their own specific training prior to the flights of Ikhana into 
the NAS. The training was conducted by and within their own organization. 
2.12 Safety Analysis 
The flight into the NAS with NASA 870 required a special safety case approach that would be addressed 
in the COA by NASA. Along with this, the FAA conducted its own safety analysis for the flights into the 
NAS.  
2.12.1 Safety Case Approach 
In order to safely operate UAS in the NAS, it was shown that the Phase 1 DAA and ATAR Systems can 
provide alternate means of compliance to 14 CFR §91.111(a) and 14 CFR §91.113(b) “see and 
avoid/remain well clear” regulations. The approach taken for this safety case entailed the following: 
1. Performed gap/compliance analysis of the DAA and ATAR systems “as installed” on the Ikhana 
UAS against published Phase 1 MOPS and TSOs for the DAA and ATAR systems. 
? DO-365 MOPS (dated 31 May, 2017) and TSO-C211 (dated 25 Sep 2017) for DAA Systems. 
? DO-366 MOPS (dated 31 May, 2017) and TSO-C212 (dated 22 Sep 2017) for ATAR for 
Traffic Surveillance. 
? The majority of the gaps were related to the display of DAA and ATAR system health and 
status information to the UAS pilot. It was determined that updates to the system 
software to display this information were not required for this demonstration due to 
Ikhana’s architecture and flight test operations concept. For Ikhana operations, system 
health and status telemetry data is downlinked to the Ikhana GCS and displayed to 
Ikhana’s pilots, who are experienced with the DAA system, and to test engineers with 
subject matter expertise to accurately assess system status. 
2. Performed gap/compliance analysis of the DAA and ATAR systems “as installed” on the Ikhana 
UAS against DO-178C software certification guidance (dated 13 Dec 2011). 
? Determined that Design Assurance Level (DAL) for all DAA related software was Level D 
for overall process/documentation, plus Level C for software testing per DO-178C (full 
code statement coverage). Table 15 DAA and ATAR Systems DALs depicts that the critical 
DAA functionality was tested to DAL C rigor requiring full code structural coverage. 
? As denoted in Table 15, the only software component of the DAA System not being tested 
to DAL C full code statement coverage was the Honeywell sensor fusion tracker hosted in 
the TPA-100 ACAS processor. To address this gap, Honeywell implemented an I/O 
crosscheck algorithm, to DAL C standards, that validated the fusion tracker’s output with 
TCAS/Extended Hybrid Surveillance. This feature ensured that the tracker’s output is 
accurate. 
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Table 15. DAA and ATAR Systems DALs. 
Software 
Component 
Function Manufacturer DO-178 
DAL Level 
Artifacts DO-178 DAL C 
Statement 
Coverage 
Notes 
DFCS Flight Code GA-ASI D Available for review 
at GA-ASI 
x  
DGCS Ground Code GA-ASI D Available for review 
at GA-ASI 
x  
SAAP DAA System 
Interface Formats 
DAA Data 
GA-ASI D Available for review 
at GA-ASI 
x  
TPA-100 Collision Avoidance 
(TCAS II) Track 
Correlation/Fusion 
ADS-B In 
Honeywell D Summary Report x I/O Cross Check TCAS 
RA Mapping 
CPDS Cockpit Display of 
Traffic DAA Alerting 
and Maneuver 
Guidance 
ISD D Summary Report x Fault Detection 
ATAR Non-Cooperative 
Traffic Detection 
GA-ASI D Available for 
Review at GA-ASI 
x Fault Detection 
 
3. Leveraged the FAA Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD) for UAS DAA System Safety 
Assessment (SSA). Its fault tree influenced NASA’s hazard report development and risk mitigation 
strategy. 
4. Developed operational mitigations to reduce risk and address performance gaps. 
? Air Traffic Management (ATM) Services: 
o The NCC route of flight ensures its mission stays above MVA to leverage the 
legacy ATM safety systems (primary and secondary surveillance radar coverage). 
? Datalink Management: 
o Although the Ku SATCOM BRLOS link has been very reliable on the NASA Ikhana 
UAS, the NCC route of flight was tailored to minimize operations in Class E <10k 
ft MSL until the UAS was within C-Band DLOS range. This was expected to occur 
prior to waypoint 7 (Figure 12) before initiating the descent from 15k ft MSL to 
9,000 ft MSL. 
? Route of Flight: 
o The NCC mission plan was carefully developed to remain off of published airways 
and away from known flight activity associated with gliders and other small 
aircraft that NASA had not fully tested the ATAR system against. Flight tests were 
utilized to validate ATAR performance predictions using RCS modeling and 
simulations for medium and large aircraft. Modeling and simulation results 
showed sufficient detection and track performance against small RCS aircraft 
such as gliders; however, to further reduce risk, this flight demonstration was 
planned to remain clear of areas with known glider activity. 
5. Pedigree of DAA Flight Tests. 
? Ikhana UAS DAA flight test campaigns completed: 
o (Nov - Dec 2014): ACAS Xu: 9 flights, 170 mission encounters flown (1 intruder) 
o (June - July 2015): FT3: 11 flights, 212 encounters flown (up to 2 intruders) 
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o (April - June 2016): FT4: 19 flights, 321 mission encounters flown (up to 4 
intruders) 
o (June - July 2017): ACAS Xu FT2: 12 flights, 241 mission encounters flown (up to 2 
intruders) 
? Over 4 flight test campaigns, completed over 1,000 encounters inclusive of mission 
encounters and system checkout activities. 
o A majority of these encounters were setup with horizontal and vertical separation 
that penetrated the DAA well clear definition of 4,000 ft lateral distance and ±450 
ft vertical offset. Many encounters were conducted with vertical separation as 
low as 200 ft (with lateral separation of 2,400 ft). Beak-to-beak encounters with 
no lateral separation were conducted with 500 ft vertical separation. 
? No major DAA nor ATAR systems failures have occurred 
o An intermittent Ethernet communications link between the Honeywell TPA-100 
processor and the SAAP was corrected with an interface redesign that does not 
utilize this Ethernet link and is more production representative. 
o No link loss of the C-Band LOS nor the Ku SATCOM BRLOS links has occurred. 
o During these scripted encounters, the intruder aircraft, ranging from a TG-14 
motorized glider to a G-III business jet, were detected and tracked by the ATAR 
typically at the start of the encounter at approximately 10 – 15 nmi. This 
performance is well in excess of the 6 nmi radar declaration range minimum 
standard delineated in the DO-366 ATAR MOPS and TSOC212. 
2.12.2 Safety Risk Management Panel 
The FAA chose to hold a SRMP in order to help review and construct the SRMD. This panel was conducted 
at NASA AFRC and included experts from the FAA that addressed the hazards and safety case of flying into 
the NAS without chase. It was beneficial both to the FAA and to the UAS-NAS team for the panel to be 
held at AFRC: this way, any questions that the FAA had were quickly be addressed by the team and action 
items could be distributed rapidly.  
The FAA created three main hazards to address: loss of DAA, lost link, and DAA failing to detect low RCS 
non-cooperative equipped aircraft. These hazards were discussed in depth and mitigations were captured. 
Limitations to each of the hazards were also captured during this panel (e.g., what would constitute a 
RTB). The action items brought up from discussions of these hazards included providing maintenance 
procedures and technical orders for Ikhana, checklists, pilot training, proof of mishap plans, lost link 
occurrence rates, and DAA equipment failure rates. 
In addition, discussions from this panel helped to modify the route further. Changes were made to the 
Victorville routing and the lost link was updated to procedures that the FAA found more suitable than the 
original proposition. 
With the cooperation of the FAA, UAS-NAS, and Ikhana teams, a SRMD was written and eventually 
approved to supplement the COA, providing a waiver to finally fly into the NAS without a chase vehicle. 
The mitigations identified in the SRMD were called out in the COA as requirements to comply with in order 
to operate. 
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3 Results and Analysis 
The culmination of all efforts lead to the team performing the SCO and demonstration flights. The SCO 
flights served their purpose, as problems were identified during these flights, allowing the team time to 
resolve them prior to the demo flights. A description of the results and team’s analysis of the flights is 
below. 
3.1 System Checkout Flights 
Once the team had conducted the No Chase COA System Checkout Tech Brief, an approved flight request 
was given. The aircrew conducted a tabletop training session to prepare for the upcoming encounters. 
Specific details were given on the DAA display and what to expect during the avoidance maneuvers. 
3.1.1 Flight 1 – 14 February 2018 
There were three main purposes for flight 1 of the system checkout. The first was to ensure that the pilots 
and aircrew were proficient and current in order to complete the upcoming SCO flights safely and 
efficiently. The second purpose was to power up the DAA system to verify that all the components were 
working appropriately and that no errors were experienced. The final purpose was to complete the 
remainder of the Ikhana envelope expansion test points. Envelope expansion was necessary because AFRC 
management had not yet approved the entire MQ-9 envelope for Ikhana with the modified nose. Opening 
up the envelope ensured greater flexibility that could be needed in the NAS. For this flight, no encounters 
were planned. 
The flight was completed on 14 February 2018 within R-2515 airspace. Ikhana took off from EAFB runway 
22 Left at 0610L and proceeded to climb to test altitude. The first checkout was powering the DAA system 
at 0640L. Once powered, the Ikhana team searched for valid data telemetered to the ground and that no 
anomalies were found. All checks looked good and the team powered the DAA systems down and 
concluded the DAA system checkout at 0708L. 
The next objective for this flight was the envelope expansion. This series of test points were to verify the 
aircraft’s ability to fly at 30,000 ft MSL at various airspeeds with the modified nose. The test began at 
0722L and was concluded at 0903L. The team completed test points required to expand the envelope and 
made an uneventful landing at EAFB on runway 22L at 0942L. 
3.1.2 Flight 2 – 15 February 2018 
This was the first No Chase COA System checkout flight where the DAA system was being tested. Eighteen 
flight test cards were planned for this test day and the team successfully completed 16 encounters. Two 
intruder aircraft were used for this flight: NASA 856 (TG-14) and NASA 808 (G-III). See the flight details 
and MCC3 recorded data below in Table 16. 
Notes: The Ikhana UAS took off at 0706L, NASA 856 took off at 0658L. Ku SATCOM hits were noted at the 
encounter with COMEX 0801. Due to the momentary loss of the DAA system, the encounter was aborted 
and was repeated. At 0815L NASA 808 took off and NASA 856 landed at 0833L. It was noticed that there 
were no increased TCAS alerts with the encounter at COMEX 0915. However, TCAS alerts were received 
when executing ATCAS-23 at 0928L. At the encounter with COMEX 1020, an alert for a bad SAAP was 
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received in the GCS. The team reset the SAAP and radar with no further issues. The encounter with COMEX 
1041 was aborted due to the intruder not acquiring visual identification of Ikhana within 1.0 nmi. 
Airspace: After the encounter at 0928L, SPORT required that Ikhana stay between 16,000 ft and FL220. 
Due to this restriction it was determined that card 11 would be conducted next with redlines to the 
altitudes, fitting the altitude restriction. This restriction was lifted for the rest of the test day at 0956L. 
Table 16. No Chase COA System Checkout Flight 2 Data and Observation Notes. 
 
3.1.3 Flight 3 Attempt 1 – 28 February 2018 
For the third SCO flight, Ikhana experienced a degraded C-Band datalink which caused the team to call a 
“knock it off”, return to base, and conduct an investigation. More information on this event can be 
found in the Flight Systems Comments Section 3.3.1. 
3.1.4 Flight 3 Attempt 2 – 28 March 2018 
Once the investigation was completed and the team had gone back to tech brief, the Ikhana UAS was 
approved to fly again. Flight details and MCC3 recorded data is below in Table 17. 
Notes: The test day started with Ikhana taking off at 0605L and NASA 7 (B200 King Air) taking off at 0630L. 
The Unique Ku only and Use Case test cards were completed successfully. The encounter with a COMEX 
of 0751 encountered multiple resets and an abort call due to the sensors turning off but was completed 
successfully with a COMEX of 0850. Each test card was completed including two cards that were unable 
to be accomplished during the second SCO flight. 
Airspace: During the same encounter mentioned above, SPORT had placed an FL180 restriction in the area 
that was being tested. Due to this, 10,000 ft was added to the test point altitudes, including abort and 
deconfliction altitudes, in order to complete these test cards. 
 
 
 
Flight
Run# Encounter COMEX Intruder VID Wind O/S Term. Maneuver TA RA Redlines
1 SQK-6 - No VID 0726 856 1.1 325/11 0728 Fly Through Yes Yes
2 SQK-6 0738 856 4.5 0739 Left Turn
3 SQK-7 0748 856 Yes 0749 Right Turn Yes
4 SQK-8 - Abort 0801 856 abort Mode C / Latitude N34° 57.47'
5 SQK-8 0809 856 2.6 0810 Right Turn Mode C / Latitude N34° 57.47'
6 LALT-24 0820 856 1 0823 Fly Through Yes Yes
7 LALT-25 0830 856 0832 Right Turn Yes
8 ATCAS-22 No VID 0859 808 0.5 0900 Fly Through Yes Yes O/S No descent
9 ATCAS-22 0915 808 0.5 244/46 0916 Yes Yes O/S No descent
10 ATCAS-23 0928 808 2.5 0929 Yes Yes
11 NUIS-13 0945 808 0947 Left Turn; Heading 190 Yes Altitudes +7000ft
12 NUIS-14 0956 808 2 0958 Yes
13 DB-15 1020 808 1022 Left Turn; Leveling at 8000 Yes Yes
14 HS-11 1033 808 1.7 1035 Fly Through Yes Yes
15 TM-1 1041 808 0.7 1042 Fly Through Yes Yes
16 HDR-16 1051 808 1053 Fly Through
2
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Table 17. No Chase COA System Checkout Flight 3 Attempt 2 Data and Observation Notes. 
 
3.2 Demonstration Flights 
Previously thought to take 2.5 hours, the flights into the NAS went smoothly. Due to the early takeoff 
time, the traffic in the NAS was not as high as other times during the day. Because of this, fewer 
interactions with ATC and route diversions occurred, but the DAA system properly provided awareness. 
All scenarios encountered in the NAS had been previously tested during the many flight test and system 
checkouts performed by the team. 
3.2.1 With Chase 
The first flight into the NAS, with chase, was flow on Thursday, 24 May 2018. Ikhana took off at 0624L and 
landed at 0900L at EAFB. The route into the NAS had a duration of 1 hr, 51 min. The chase vehicle for this 
flight was NASA 801, the B200 King Air. On board were a photographer and videographer in order to 
record the historic event. The flight began with NASA 801 taking off slightly before NASA 870 and 
performing an airborne pickup while in R-2508.  
Inside R-2508, Ikhana climbed to FL200, departed this airspace as the lead of the formation, and began its 
flight into the NAS. At approximately 0735L, after waypoint 6, it descended to 17,000 ft MSL. At 0742L, 
after waypoint 7, it descended to 15,000 ft MSL. At 0809L, after waypoint 9, it descended to 9,000 ft MSL. 
At 0832L, after waypoint 14, it descended to 6,000 ft MSL. At 0836L, NASA 870 descended to 5,000 ft MSL 
after waypoint 15. And finally, Ikhana climbed back to 9,000 ft MSL after waypoint 17, then flew back into 
R-2515. 
Table 18 below is a summary of the time to each waypoint. All times are in local Pacific Time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight
Run# Encounter COMEX Intruder VID Wind O/S Term. Maneuver TA RA Redlines
1 KU-1 0655 NASA 7 1 0657 Fly Through Yes Yes
2 KU-2 0705 NASA 7 5.5 0707 Left Turn Yes
3 OTD-25 0716 NASA 7 2.5 0718 Right Turn Yes
4 UC-2 0731 NASA 7 1.4 0733 Climb / Left Turn Yes Yes
5 IOT-17 0741 NASA 7 4.5 0745 Fly Through Yes Yes Altitudes +10000ft
6 IOT-18 0850 NASA 7 2.4 0852 Right Turn Yes Altitudes +10000ft
7 OOT-19 0906 NASA 7 2 0908 Left Turn Yes Yes Altitudes +10000ft
8 LT-20 0915 NASA 7 2.5 0917 Right Turn Yes Yes Altitudes +10000ft
9 LT-21 0925 NASA 7 2 0928 Descent Yes Yes Altitudes +10000ft
10 LT-21 - Repeat 0935 NASA 7 1.1 0931 Descent Yes Yes Altitudes +10000ft
11 KU-01 - Repeat 0946 NASA 7 2.1 0948 Fly Through Yes Yes Altitudes +6000ft
12 LOB-9 0956 NASA 7 1.5 0958 Descent Yes Yes Altitudes +11000ft
13 LOB-10 1006 NASA 7 2.8 1008 Descent Yes Yes Altitudes +11000ft
3
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Table 18. Summary of Time at Waypoints for Flight into NAS with Chase, 24 May 2018. 
Waypoint Time (local) Waypoint Time (local) 
1 0654 10 0814 
2 0701 11 0823 
3 0712 12 0826 
4 0715 13 0830 
5 0731 14 0832 
6 0734 15 0836 
7 0743 16 0839 
8 0757 17 0839 
9 0808 18 0845 
 
This flight had a few significant firsts, such as an encounter executed safely in the NAS, a DAA system used 
to fly into Class E and D airspace, and a transition into two ARTCCs by a UAS in the NAS.  
At approximately 0707L, NASA 870 received a corrective alert on SWA462, the team’s first “encounter” in 
the NAS. Additionally, all objectives for this flight were met, including being handed off to several ARTCCs: 
checking in with ZOA at 0721L and back with ZLA at 0736L. NASA 870 also started its descent and transit 
of Class D airspace at 0836L.  
Generally, all DAA systems worked as expected. The team saw extended hybrid surveillance on ADS-B 
equipped traffic, witnessed sensor fusion working on the DAA system, and received DAA alerting and 
guidance from aircraft (specifically, the brief corrective alert on the descending SWA462 737 until it 
leveled off at ATC-assigned altitude 2,000 ft above Ikhana). Additionally, a TCAS TA was seen on the DAA 
system on SWA462 as it descended to 1,000 ft above Ikhana and passed safely 1.3 nmi away. Surveillance 
on VFR traffic was also observed at low altitudes. Finally, there were some ATAR split tracks observed but 
nothing outside the range of the mission rules and the agreements with the FAA. The flight operations 
around Victorville also went successfully, with a smooth transition to tower. During all phases of flight, 
ATC was providing guidance. 
Overall, the flight was a tremendous success and gave the team great experience and confidence of what 
to expect of the flight without chase. 
3.2.2 Without Chase 
The demonstration flight of NASA 870 Ikhana without chase into the NAS occurred on a clear day, on 
Tuesday, 12 June 2018. NASA 870 took off at 0604L and landed at 0846L. The duration of the flight into 
the NAS was 1 hr, 50 min. The approximate length of the route of flight outside R-2515 was 415 nmi. 
For this flight NASA 870 performed the same route as the flight with chase. The aircraft took off and 
climbed to FL200 within R-2515. After transiting at this flight level, it descended to 17,000 ft MSL at 0711L, 
after waypoint 6. At 0718L, slightly prior to waypoint 7, NASA 870 descended to 15,000 ft MSL. At 0743L, 
after waypoint 9, the aircraft descended to 9,000 ft MSL. At 0806L, after waypoint 14, Ikhana descended 
to 6,000 ft MSL, followed by a descent to 5,000 ft MSL at 0810L after waypoint 16. Finally after this 
  
 
64 
UAS-NAS NASA 870 Ikhana No Chase COA (NCC) Flights: Flight Test Report, August 2018 – Rev. A 
waypoint, at waypoint 17, Ikhana climbed back to 9,000 ft MSL and into R-2515 which was the conclusion 
of the mission. 
Check in with ZOA was at 0659L (prior to waypoint 5), check in with ZLA at 0715L (prior to waypoint 7), 
and the final descent into Class D occurred at 0810L (after waypoint 15). 
Table 19 below is a summary of the time to each waypoint. All times are in local Pacific Time. 
Table 19. Summary of Time at Waypoints for Flight into NAS without Chase, 12 June 2018. 
Waypoint Time (local) Waypoint Time (local) 
1 0628 10 0748 
2 0635 11 0756 
3 0646 12 0800 
4 0650 13 0803 
5 0708 14 0805 
6 0710 15 0809 
7 0719 16 0812 
8 0731 17 0813 
9 0742 18 0818 
 
Once more, this flight experienced milestone events for UAS in the NAS. At approximately 0747L, a first-
of-its-kind ATC interaction occurred, where ATC provided a traffic advisory on an opposite direction VFR 
traffic with an intermittent transponder and unverified altitude. Ikhana responded with “Traffic Detected” 
and ATC acknowledged. No further traffic advisories were provided on that VFR traffic since Ikhana had 
the traffic detected. Additionally, at approximately 0801L, an ATC/pilot interaction occurred where a C-
172 was provided an advisory of a UAS overtaking it to the right and 1,500 ft above. The C-172 pilot 
reported “Traffic in Sight”, affirming the information that was also already available on the NASA 870 DAA 
system display. 
Once more, a successful flight was flown into the NAS, but this time without a chase. All DAA systems 
worked as expected, which included the extended hybrid surveillance on ADS-B equipped aircraft, sensor 
fusion, and ATAR track on a VFR traffic with an intermittent transponder. The DAA alerting and guidance 
was successful, and although there were some Ku hits (momentary signal degradation), these hits were 
minor and did not significantly affect the mission, pilot SA, or break any Mission Rules, or guidelines from 
the FAA. 
This flight successfully proved that a UAS can fly into the NAS, without chase, and use a DAA system to 
safely navigate its way on a route of flight, traversing several ARTCCs and transiting through Class A, E, 
and D airspace. 
3.2.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
During both flights into the NAS, the LVC was collecting data on the performance of the DAA system. 
Specifically, the data was recorded in a “quad” format, which included for every instance of flight, 
information from the Ikhana HUD, CPDS displays, and a snapshot of the Solipsys Zeus SA display tool. 
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 NASA 870 No Chase COA Mission with Chase Aircraft (Ikhana Flight #250) 
The NASA 870 mission in the NAS with chase aircraft (Ikhana Flight #250) was flown as a rehearsal for the 
flight demo mission (to be flown without chase). Mission objectives were to: 
? Validate route of flight and mission planning 
? Validate Ku SATCOM C2 link capability throughout the route of flight 
? Validate ATC voice communications and evaluate interactions 
? Ensure adequate C-Band LOS C2 signal levels during mission segments within Class E airspace 
The majority of the time that Ikhana was operating in the NAS was uneventful; however, screenshots of 
the CPDS and Zeus displays during the mission were captured in order to highlight notable traffic events. 
Early during the mission while in Class A airspace, NASA 870 encountered descending commercial airline 
traffic (SWA462) that triggered a DAA corrective (yellow) alert due to predicted loss of well clear within 
75 sec if the current flight trajectories remained unchanged (Figure 41). Lateral separation between NASA 
870 and SWA462 was approximately 12 nmi. ZLA ARTCC controller was actively managing the situation, 
clearing SWA462 to descend and maintain FL220. The controller further cleared SWA462 to descend and 
maintain FL210. The subsequent descent and level-off at FL210 triggered a TCAS TA and “Traffic, Traffic” 
alert (audio and head-up display) to the pilot. At the closest point of approach, SWA462 was 1,000 ft 
vertical and 1.3 nmi lateral from NASA 870. Figure 42 depicts the track at CPA showing at clear of traffic 
condition. 
 
Figure 41. Class A DAA Corrective Alert with SWA462. 
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Figure 42. Clear of Traffic with SWA462. 
During the transit through Class E airspace while descending from 15,000 ft MSL at 9,000 ft MSL, NASA 
870 detected VFR traffic operating in the vicinity of Gen William J. Fox Airfield (KWJF). TCAS surveillance 
tracks were depicted on the CPDS display for the pilot (Figure 43). Later these tracks were fused with ATAR 
sensor data. 
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Figure 43. TCAS Traffic near KWJF. 
While at 9,000 ft MSL approaching Apple Valley Airport, NASA 870 detected VFR traffic operating in the 
VFR pattern (Figure 44). While at 5,000 ft MSL transiting Class D airspace at VCV, NASA 870 detected VFR 
traffic operating in the VFR pattern (Figure 45). 
 
Figure 44. TCAS Traffic near Apple Valley Airport. 
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Figure 45. TCAS Traffic near VCV. 
During the transition from VCV Class D airspace to return to restricted airspace (R-2515), NASA 870 
detected TCAS traffic within 10 nmi of its location (Figure 46). Both TCAS and ATAR surveillance tracks 
were developed. One track depicted a “fast mover” exiting R-2515 at 12,400 ft MSL, while the second 
track depicted a sensor fused track in an orbit at 11,000 ft MSL. This track was later determined to be an 
MQ-9. Notable on the CPDS display that the Vertical Profile Display depicted conflict space between 
Ikhana and the two detected intruder aircraft. 
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Figure 46. TCAS / ATAR Traffic near R-2515. 
 NASA 870 No Chase COA Mission without Chase Aircraft (Ikhana Flight 
#251) 
The NASA 870 mission in the NAS without chase aircraft (Ikhana Flight #251) flew the same flight profile 
as on Flight #250. The mission was uneventful throughout the transit through Class A and “high” Class E 
(above 10,000 ft MSL). Once NASA 870 was eastbound and level at 9,000 ft MSL, a chance encounter with 
a general aviation aircraft flying on a reciprocal path but 1-2 nmi to the north of Ikhana led to a first of its 
kind interaction with ATC (Figure 47). The Joshua controller reported opposite direction VFR traffic with 
an intermittent transponder and unverified altitude. The NASA 870 pilot replied back “Traffic Detected”, 
signaling the fact that the aircrew had detected the aircraft through its on-board DAA equipment. With 
the controller’s acknowledgment (“NASA 870 roger”) this exchange established a first-ever 
communication of a large UAS operating alone in low Class E airspace using onboard traffic to effect an 
equivalent level of safety and compliance with 14 CFR §91.111(a) and 113(b) “see and avoid/remain well 
clear” regulations. 
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Figure 47. “NASA 870, Traffic Detected”. 
Fourteen minutes after the first VFR traffic advisory, Joshua provided another advisory to a C-172 flying a 
parallel flight path but in the same direction with NASA 870 (Figure 48). In this case, ATC notified N469MB 
that he had a UAS overtaking him to the right at 9,000 ft (1,500 ft above). N469MB pilot reported “Traffic 
in Sight”. During the encounter, NASA 870 surveilled the Cessna using TCAS and ATAR sensor sources. 
 
Figure 48. TCAS / ATAR Traffic near VCV. 
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Outside of the two previously described events, two other noteworthy situations occurred during the 
flight. The first situation occurred when NASA 870 was in Class E airspace having departed 15,000 ft MSL, 
descending to 9,000 ft MSL and approximately 5 nmi west of KWJF. Joshua directed a Mooney (N6084Q) 
at 10,500 ft MSL to adjust their current heading (Figure 49). The Mooney was on an intercept heading 
with NASA 870 prior to the call from the controller. Joshua identified “opposite direction descending 
unmanned aerial vehicle traffic, fly heading 270 and expect to resume own navigation in 10 miles”. 
 
Figure 49. ATC Alters N6084Q Course from NASA 870. 
From the NASA 870 pilot perspective, no adjustment to his current flight path was necessary based on the 
SA display perspective. The project has speculated that the Joshua controller had information available 
from their perspective that identified a potential conflict between NASA 870 and the Mooney aircraft 
considering the larger enroute separation criteria employed by ATC. Figure 50 and Figure 51 show the 
sequential progression of the aforementioned scenario.  
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Figure 50. N6084Q Established on 270° Heading. 
 
Figure 51. N6084Q Passes Abeam NASA 870. 
The final scenario observed during Flight #251 was an interaction between ATC (ZLA) and UPS938. NASA 
870 was in Class A airspace flying at FL200 headed west along the early portion of the mission plan when 
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LA Center controller contacted UPS938 who was in a climb 25 nmi southeast of NASA 870 position. LA 
Center directed USP938 to “maintain 1500 fpm or greater through FL210 for traffic” (Figure 52). 
 
Figure 52. LA Center Contacts UPS938. 
Figure 53 and Figure 54 sequentially depict the progression of the scenario with UPS938. From the NASA 
870 pilot perspective, the SA display did not identify a conflict and the Vertical Profile Display (part of 
CPDS) did not show a conflict probe with UPS938. It can also be noted that as the situation progressed 
(Figure 54), UPS938 “lagged” NASA 870 which reinforces the lack of conflict display information. As in the 
previous scenario with the Mooney, the direction to the UPS B757 was most likely the result of ATC 
employing larger separation criteria for enroute traffic. 
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Figure 53. UPS938 20 nmi Southeast of NASA 870. 
 
Figure 54. UPS938 “Lagging” NASA 870. 
3.3 Detect and Avoid Display Performance 
Throughout all flights, it was important to have the DAA system performing smoothly. The feedback from 
flight systems and the pilots gave the team information on how to improve for each subsequent flight. 
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3.3.1 Flight Systems Comments and Discrepancies 
Prior to the two NCC demonstration flights, a set of verification and validation ground and flight tests were 
executed to check basic functionality of the system, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) between 
components, no electromagnetic interference (EMI) between systems, verification of guidance and 
alerting system in nominal and off-nominal conditions, and validation of mission systems that would be 
used to support the demonstration flights. Although the results of the ground tests were nominal, the 
NCC SCO flights several revealed anomalies in the system that required a satisfactory resolution prior to 
the NCC demonstration flights. The solutions, lessons learned, and workarounds developed for the issues 
observed during the SCO flights proved extremely effective since they enabled the flight crew and test 
team to maintain excellent SA of proximal traffic during the entirety of the two NCC flights with only minor 
anomalies previously experienced and briefed to the FAA and NASA AFRC review boards. 
 System Checkout Flights 
Three SCO flights were conducted to perform regression testing of the modified Ikhana flight software, 
basic DAA payload power up checks, verification of the payload safety nets, performance of DAA remain 
well clear maneuver while in Ku-band SATCOM command & control, and validation of DAA system for air-
to-air encounters representative of NAS operations.  
3.3.1.1.1 SCO Flight 1 
The first SCO flight (SCO-1: Ikhana Flight 245) was executed without issues, but it did not exercise the DAA 
system since it only included a quick power up and shutdown of the DAA system.  
3.3.1.1.2 SCO Flight 2 
In the second SCO flight (SCO-2: Ikhana Flight 246), data to the traffic display was lost and an unexpected 
system state was observed on the Variable Information Table (VIT-78: SAA Sensor Status) health and 
status (H&S) display. Based on the VIT information, a real-time assessment of the issue pointed to a 
problem between the SAAP and ATAR interface link. However, the lack of data to the traffic display could 
not be traced to the state of the H&S displays. The H&S states displayed to the flight systems engineer 
should have allowed, at a minimum, Ikhana ownship data to be displayed on the traffic display. The system 
operated nominally after a power cycle of all the DAA systems was performed by the sensor operator. 
Post-flight analysis of the issue traced the problem to a design flaw in the Ballard Technology (PMC05) 
Ethernet board that provided the data interface between the SAAP (Ballard Technology AB3000 
computer) and ATAR. This intermittent board failure caused the SAAP to fail leading to lack of data to the 
traffic display. The manufacturer refurbished the AB3000 computer with a new PMC05 board since they 
suspected the issue was caused by degradation of the board due to aging. This issue was captured as a 
discrepancy report (DR), Flight 246 DAA SAAP Health Bad. 
3.3.1.1.3 SCO Flight 3 Attempt 1 
For the third SCO flight (SCO-3: Flight 247), the Ikhana UAS encountered an intermittent issue with the 
fiber optic multiplexers (FOM) that provides the command & control interface between the Ikhana ground 
control station (GCS) and the Semi Mobile UAS Remote Facility (SMURF) antenna station. This caused 
severe degradation of the C-Band datalink that triggered a “Knock-it-Off” condition and a RTB. This event 
was reported as a “close-call” using the AFRC safety process. The Ikhana team developed a thorough “Go-
Forward” plan that included new checklist procedures, system monitoring procedures, ground tests, and 
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flight test. After a Tech Brief on the findings and corrective actions proposed by the Ikhana team for this 
particular DR, AFRC Senior Management approved the team to execute the “Go-Forward” plan without 
any issues.   
3.3.1.1.4 SCO Flight 3 Attempt 2 
Since the required SCO-3 test points could not be completed during Ikhana Flight 247, the SCO flight was 
repeated a month later during Ikhana Flight 248. In this flight, two anomalies were observed by the 
engineering team. During a scripted encounter, the expected ADS-B symbology for the intruder dropped 
from the traffic display. On one of the engineering displays, the ADS-B and fused target reports for local 
traffic disappeared from the traffic list. Only active surveillance/TCAS tracks were observed on the traffic 
and engineering displays. A visual scan of the VIT-78: SAA SENSOR STATUS and VIT-77: SAA Processor H&S 
displays showed a mostly healthy system with unexpected states for a few sensor parameters. After 
approximately 40 seconds, the traffic symbology and system status returned to a nominal state on all DAA 
payload displays. Post flight analysis performed by Honeywell determined that the Honeywell Fusion 
Tracker software restarted automatically after an unexpected failure. During the software restart, the 
Honeywell TPA-100B Processor failed automatically to the certified TCAS II v7.1 Collision Avoidance 
System (CAS) path. In the implementation of the NCC architecture, the team decided to design a feature 
in the Honeywell system that would perform validation cross-checks between the tracks reported by the 
Fusion Tracker and TCAS logic.  This design consideration was implemented since the Fusion Tracker could 
not be tested to the required DAL C requirements. The DAL C requirements were instead placed on the 
validation cross-checker to ensure that the system would revert to a TCAS option if the tracker failed. 
Although the restart was unexpected, the system behavior reacted in accordance with the expected 
design. This failure would not be observed again, but it was captured in the following DR: Honeywell 
Sensor Fusion/Tracker Software Restart 
A second minor anomaly was observed when the ADS-B sensor contribution to the Honeywell Fusion 
Tracker was deselected. The expected behavior was a single fused track with DAA guidance on the single 
track. However, the tracker reported the single intruder as two tracks (radar-only and TCAS-only) on the 
traffic display, shown in Figure 55. The DAA algorithm provided alerting and maneuvering guidance for 
each track separately. Post flight analysis confirmed that a software error in the Fusion Tracker software 
prevented the fusion of TCAS Mode S and Radar targets. This observation, reported to the FAA, was 
treated as a nuisance anomaly with additional training as the disposition.  
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Figure 55. A transition from nominal state, dropping the track, dropped ADS-B and radar tracks, and 
finally, tracks return. 
 Demonstration Flights 
In both flights with and without chase, the DAA system behaved well and without unexpected problems. 
Below are some additional comments for each phase. 
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3.3.1.2.1 With Chase 
The NCC Demonstration Flight with a chase aircraft (Flight 250) was mostly uneventful with only a brief 
encounter with a Southwest Airlines (SWA462) aircraft that caused a DAA corrective alert to trigger; see 
Figure 56. The SWA462 encounter was tracked by the engineering team and test pilots as it descended 
from FL310 to FL220. The target was acquired by all three sensors (ATAR, ADS-B, and TCAS) and was 
successfully fused by the Honeywell Fusion Tracker throughout the encounter. The DAA system’s alerting 
and guidance logic behaved exactly as expected and observed in previous flight tests with similarly 
scripted geometry encounters. Throughout the flight, targets observed on the DAA traffic display were 
visually validated against the Zeus traffic display, which uses a network of ground sensors (radars and 
ADS-B) for its traffic feed. The DAA system behaved well during this flight without any unexpected issues. 
The DAA traffic and H&S displays provided sufficient SA of the system’s status and airspace picture to the 
engineering team and test pilots in the GCS.  
 
Figure 56. DAA Traffic Displaying during SWA462 Encounter. 
3.3.1.2.2 Without Chase  
In the NCC demonstration flight, the DAA system functioned as expected without any issues. As shown in 
Figure 57, the ATAR sensor detected and reported a target with an intermittent transponder to the DAA 
traffic display. The Ikhana pilots responded to ATC with “Traffic Detected” once the VFR traffic was 
detected on the DAA system. The DAA system provided a clear airspace picture to the engineering team 
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and pilots. Traffic reported by ATC was easily acquired on the DAA display. The only system problems 
encountered during this flight were the intermittent Ku-band downlink hits that stopped data flow to the 
DAA traffic display. Although the issue was close to turning into a nuisance, the engineering team 
maintained sufficient SA on the traffic trends from the intermittent data that a decision to switch to the 
backup DLOS datalink was not called. Unexpected “pop-up” radar targets that triggered brief warning 
alerts were also observed as the aircraft entered EAFB. This behavior has been observed in previous flight 
test campaigns where the same ATAR system was used. Due to the targets reported characteristics 
(airspeed, altitude, vertical velocity), they were reported as “false tracks.” Further analysis into the raw 
radar data needs to be performed to verify the cause of these “pop-up” targets.  
 
Figure 57. DAA System Tracking VFR Traffic. 
3.3.2 Ikhana Aircrew Comments 
For NASA 870’s pilots, the scripted encounters and DAA system had evolved over the years and were 
smooth and understandable. The team had developed guidelines and training, keeping the same crew 
throughout the flights, in order to achieve the high rate of success. Within the DAA system, the pilots 
suggested that although the range rings on the traffic display were useful for estimating airspace range, 
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the option to enable/disable a geo-referenced background of aeronautical charts or terrain would have 
provide better SA on the distance between targets. Workload was also still high for both the NASA 870 
and manned intruder aircraft, but due to the years of training and flight tests, the aircrew gathered data 
successfully. 
Because of this, doing the flights into the NAS was simpler, and it was an easy transition to an operational 
mission. With the countless hours, more than 1,000 encounters within R-2515, and operational structure, 
the demonstration flights held no surprises for the pilots when it came to flying the DAA system in the 
NAS. Coupled with ATC audio, the pilots watched encounters develop in the NAS, just as they had trained 
for within R-2515 with scripted encounters. The team had excellent SA with the DAA system. 
3.4 Route Assessment 
The route was assessed and feedback was provided by the Ikhana pilots, ATC, and Air Traffic Services (AJT). 
Their comments are below. 
3.4.1 Ikhana Pilot Comments 
In terms of the submission of the COA, the pilot workload was minimal. They were tasked with getting 
maps and providing some routing. Most of the interactions for the COA and the FAA were through the 
Operations Engineers and the UAS-NAS team. 
The planning meetings were also extremely successful when it came to safety and contingency planning. 
Topics that the team had not initially considered were vetted through the SSWGs and the OWGs, creating 
a sound plan for the route. 
In terms of the flights into the NAS, the Ikhana pilots felt they were worked slightly differently than other 
aircraft. For example, one controller mentioned to the NASA 870 pilot about changing altitude “before 
waypoint 9”. To other traffic on that frequency, this callout could have been seen as confusing, as this was 
specific to the NCC route of flight. The route of flight could also have been expanded by varying the routing 
and altitudes to record additional data. Other than this, the pilots felt it was a normal file-and-fly mission 
and felt comfortable flying in the NAS.  
3.4.2 ATC Comments 
The team asked to receive feedback from ATC from the perspective of operations during flight, in the 
hopes to improve future flights. Below is a brief summary of comments received from a NASA Ames Senior 
Air Traffic Control Associate, who was at ZOA at the time of both missions. 
With?Chase
The Area South supervisor reported that the NASA 870 did not impact area operations and did not require 
any special actions on their part. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ????????? ???? ???????????? ????? ???? ??????
????????? ?????? ?????? ????????? ? ?????? ????? ???? ???????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
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The controller had an information sheet for NASA 870 and the sector which provided flight plan 
information and the visual depiction of the route.  The controller had also received a verbal briefing on 
the flight, which reviewed this materiel.  The controller felt the information provided was more than 
adequate for the flight. 
The assessment from the NASA Ames Senior Air Traffic Control Associate was that NASA 870 was a routine 
flight that proceeded without issue. Traffic in ZOA-11 was very light and the complexity was not difficult.  
The track on NASA 870 was excellent with the secondary target and primary target displayed. 
Table 20 was provided as a summary of events from the perspective of ZOA ARTCC from the flight with 
chase. 
Table 20. Event Log Summary from ZOA for Flight with Chase. 
Time (UTC) Event 
1350 Plugged into ZOA Sector 11. NASA 870 orbiting in R-2515. Sector configuration: 
Sector 11 combined at the R-side. NCT and SCT operating on the West Plan. Sector 
MAP: 12. Forecast ETMS traffic: 3 to 8 aircraft every 15 minutes. 
1415 Controller displayed the Full Data Block for NASA 870. 
1420 Handoff initiated by ZLA-15 and accepted by ZOA-11. ZLA-15 initiated coordination 
with ZOA-11 to advise that NASA 870 had a chase aircraft with him and asked if ZOA-
11 was briefed on the flight. ZOA-11 advised that they were aware of the NASA 870 
flight. ZOA Traffic: 6 aircraft displayed, 2 on Frequency. 
1421 NASA 870 checked in with ZOA-11. NASA 801 checked in immediately following 
(“two”). ZOA acknowledged NASA 870. Controller commented on NASA 870’s ground 
speed of 261 knots. He checked wind aloft and noted a 30 knot following wind. No 
aircraft noted on the display within 40 nmi of NASA 870. 
1425 NASA 870 enters ZOA-11 airspace. 
1426 ZOA-11 Traffic: 2 aircraft displayed, 1 aircraft on frequency. 
1429 Radar controller relieved at 1429. D-side controller added with arrival of additional 
area staffing. Standard position debrief completed including information on NASA 
870. 
1431 NASA 870 initiated left turn at waypoint 5 in accordance with the flight plan. ZOA-11 
Traffic: 3 aircraft displayed, two aircraft on frequency. 
1433 NASA 870 requested descent to one-seven-thousand. ZOA-11 radar controller 
advised NASA 870 to stand by and the D-side controller initiated a point out to ZOA-
10 for 17,000 ft. ZOA-10 approved the request. 
1434 ZOA-11 cleared NASA 870 to one-seven-thousand, altimeter three-zero-zero-one. 
NASA 870 read-back the clearance and began to descend. 
1435 Hand-off initiated by ZOA-11 to ZLA-15. ZLA-15 accepted the hand-off. 
1436 ZOA-11 advised NASA 870 to contact ZLA-15. Acknowledged by NASA 870. 
1440 NASA 870 departed ZOA airspace and the Full Data Block was removed from the 
display. 
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Without Chase
The ZOA-16 radar controller indicated that NASA 870 did not impact the overall workload of the sector 
any more than any other aircraft. They did not handle the aircraft any differently than any other aircraft 
under their control. The controller issued a clearance to 17,000 ft to NASA 870 at the request of the pilot. 
No other clearances or traffic advisories were issued.  
The Area South supervisor reported that the NASA 870 did not impact area operations and did not 
require any special actions on ????? part.
The Sector 11 controller had an information sheet for NASA 870, which provided flight plan information 
and the visual depiction of the route. Identical information was delivered to the Sector 16 controller prior 
to the aircraft being handed-off. The Sector 16 controller recalled that they had received a verbal briefing 
on the flight, but indicated that they did not recall the complete contents of the briefing. The controller 
felt the information provided adequate information on the route of flight. However, the controller 
expressed concern on the lack of information provided for contingencies, such as lost link or No Radio 
(NORDO) procedures. This controller also indicated that more information on how the UAS operated and 
information on aircraft characteristics would have been helpful. 
The area supervisor indicated that the information provided in the graphic lacked specific locations for 
the waypoints flown by NASA 870. They expressed the opinion that this information would have been 
beneficial to the controllers working the aircraft. The area supervisor suggested that the graphic would 
have been more effective if the background had depicted the Low Altitude Chart rather than the sectional 
chart. 
The assessment from the NASA Ames Senior Air Traffic Control Associate was that NASA 870 was a routine 
flight that proceeded without issue. Unlike the original flight with the chase aircraft, the controller at 
Sector 11 opted to hand NASA 870 off to the low altitude sector, ZOA-16, rather than initiate a Point Out. 
Traffic in Sector 11 began at a moderate level and decreased to light traffic while Ikhana was on the 
frequency. Traffic in Sector 16 was very light. The complexity in both sectors was not difficult. The track 
on NASA 870 was excellent with the secondary target displayed. 
Table 21 was provided as a summary of events from the perspective of ZOA ARTCC from the flight without 
chase. 
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Table 21. Event Log Summary from ZOA for Flight without Chase. 
Time (UTC) Event 
1350 Plugged into ZOA Sector 11. NASA 870 observed in ZLA-15 airspace progressing 
waypoint 3 as an enhanced limited data block. Sector configuration: Sector 11 
combined at the R-side. NCT and SCT operating on the West Plan. Sector MAP: 12. 
Forecast ETMS traffic: 3 to 8 aircraft every 15 minutes. 
1354 Handoff initiated by ZLA-15 and accepted by ZOA-11. Full Data Block for NASA 870 
displayed. ZOA-11 traffic: 11 aircraft displayed, 9 aircraft on frequency, light to 
moderate traffic density, complexity not difficult. 
1355 ZOA-11 accepted the handoff from ZLA-15. 
1358 ZOA-11 initiated coordination with ZOA-16 to ensure that the controller had the 
briefing material for NASA 870. The supervisor provided the material to the ZOA-
16 controller. ZOA-11 advised ZOA-16 of his intention to hand-off NASA 870. 
1359 NASA 870 checked in with ZOA-11, level FL200. NASA 870 ground speed: 242 
knots. ZOA-11 traffic: 6 aircraft displayed, 4 aircraft on frequency, light traffic 
density, complexity not difficult. 
1401 NASA 870 enters ZOA-11 airspace. ZOA-11 initiated a handoff to ZOA-16. ZOA-16 
accepted the hand off. ZOA-11 directed NASA 870 to contact ZOA-16. 
1402 Plugged in to ZOA-16. Sector 16 combined with sector 22. Sector 16 staffed with a 
radar controller only. NASA 870 checked in with ZOA-16, level FL200. ZOA-16 
traffic: 3 aircraft displayed, 3 aircraft on frequency, very light traffic density, 
complexity not difficult. 
1409 ZOA-16 traffic: 4 aircraft displayed, 4 aircraft on frequency, very light traffic 
density, complexity not difficult. 
1410 NASA 870 requested descent to one-seven-thousand. ZOA-16 radar controller 
cleared NASA 870 to one-seven-thousand, Lemoore altimeter two-niner-eight-
three. NASA 870 read-back the clearance and began to descend. 
1413 Hand-off initiated by ZOA-16 to ZLA-15. ZLA-15 accepted the hand-off. NASA 870 
level at 17,000 ft. 
1415 ZOA-16 advised NASA 870 to contact ZLA-15 on 119.05. Acknowledged by NASA 
870. 
1416 NASA 870 departed ZOA airspace and the Full Data Block was removed from the 
display. 
3.4.3 AJT Comments 
AJT began their involvement in advance of the final mission design. All air traffic facilities proposed for 
involvement had representation at the SRMP, as well as bargaining unit members from those facilities 
represented by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). These personnel provided input 
for use in the flight planning and the mitigations to any hazards presented at the panel through their 
respective AJT Headquarters (HQ) panel member or NATCA panel member as appropriate. 
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Review of the proposed flight plan route by personnel from ZLA, ZOA, and E10 JCF at the SRMP presented 
an initial challenge to the desired goal of the NASA team to complete flight through Class A airspace, Class 
E airspace above 10,000 ft, Class E airspace below 10,000 ft where non-cooperative traffic (primary only, 
no transponder) equipped aircraft would be located, and through Class D airspace. The portion of flight 
from the original proposal by NASA did not allow the access to the Class D airspace at VCV because of 
MVAs west of the airport.  The JCF personnel were asked to review the proposed route and develop a 
solution to allow access to the Class D airspace, a challenge they accepted, embraced, and completed in 
a short amount of consultation time at the facility, and upon return, provided the full mission opportunity 
sought by NASA. 
The completion of the no chase flight ended with no incidents. There was positive interaction with ATC 
and the PIC of Ikhana during the flight. Some non-cooperative traffic was not detected by the onboard 
DAA system. This is likely due to the fact that the DAA system is only designed to return primary returns 
in altitudes which are in proximity to the Ikhana, not all the way to the ground.  
Coordination, planning, and the time of day in which this operation occurred contributed significantly to 
the success of this project. Route planning and coordination were executed seamlessly within air traffic 
and between NASA pilots.   
Overall, it was a successful event from the ATC and UAS advancement perspectives. In nominal state and 
following normal ATC/PIC protocols, this was no different than a manned flight under the same conditions. 
The following are more detailed comments in regards to the flights with and without chase from the 
several centers. 
With Chase
AJT personnel, in conjunction with NATCA, prepared briefing materials for the facility personnel involved 
and conducted preparation telecon coordination and expectation set. Planning continued in the 
background. Technical issues concerning spectrum availability and clearance of this issue delayed the 
original proposed flights for several weeks. After the technical issue resolution, the initial flight as 
originally proposed with a chase aircraft was conducted on 24 May 2018.  
NASA 870 and accompanying chase departed the Edwards Restricted Area Complex. They were handled 
by ZLA then ZOA, back to ZLA, then JCF. NASA 870 was in the NAS for 1 hour and 51 minutes, completing 
all proposed airspace access before returning to the Edwards Complex. Below are the operational 
assessments from the first flight with a chase. 
3.4.3.1.1 ZLA 
? Operational Assessment:
ZLA did not experience any problems with the “chase operation”.
? Impact to the operation:
Low impact due to the time of day.
3.4.3.1.2 ZOA 
ZOA reported no operational issues with Ikhana NASA 870 chase flight. 
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3.4.3.1.3 JCF 
? Operational Assessment:
After completing low approach at VCV, NASA checked on Joshua’s frequency climbing to 9,000 ft.
NASA’s assigned altitude was 5,000 ft.
? Impact to the operation:
NASA started a climb to 9,000 ft without an ATC clearance. The incident with the errant climb by
the NASA PIC off the “low approach” at VCV, was reported and proper investigation proceeded.
? Feedback to improve future operations:
NASA should comply with all ATC clearances.
Without Chase  
After the flight with the chase aircraft, NASA was granted further monetary and operational extension for 
the Ikhana program to complete the no chase flight. Again, parties involved were given much shorter flight 
scheduling notice than would have been ideal, so AJT and NATCA along with ZLA/ZOA and JCF personnel 
again provided briefings to personnel on the mission. 
The no chase mission was flown on 12 June 2018.  The route was the same as the previous mission with 
the chase aircraft. The following reports were received by AJT. 
3.4.3.2.1 ZLA 
ZLA had no issues with the operation, just as planned. 
3.4.3.2.2 ZOA 
ZOA provided the following collaborative feedback on the NASA NCC operations: 
On its current route of flight, the NASA no chase flight had minimal impact to the operation.  There was 
one other aircraft who was impacted by the flight. The aircraft was held high to keep away from the traffic, 
but that flight usually remained high.  On a different route there could be significant impact to operations, 
depending on the specific routing. 
With regard to the training, because controllers had full training (for the delayed mission) and then full 
refresher training, the refresher could have been condensed. If this mission happened on a regular or 
routine basis, a briefing sheet in the area would be all that was needed for employees who received the 
initial training.  If the mission happened only rarely, refresher training would be offered to employees who 
were scheduled to work during the mission. This would ensure that employees were familiar with the Lost 
Link procedure.  In either case, new employees in the area would need to receive the initial training prior 
to working a mission. 
As with all missions, changes to route, altitude, or timing might require additional training and have a 
bigger impact on operations. 
3.4.3.2.3 JCF 
NASA?870 performed very well, without a chase aircraft, while under the jurisdiction of JCF. 
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The methods by which the flight was performed were slightly different, departing on a local ??????, 
picking up an IFR clearance for exit of R-2515 at FL200 only when ready to receive it after climbing up 
within that protected airspace; the handoff to ZLA occurred without incident. 
Upon the return of NASA 870 to the Antelope Sector, the aircraft seemed to have no issues. The controller 
vectored one VFR aircraft to remain south, while intending to fly westbound, climbing with VFR flight 
following from an altitude below 9,000 ft to VFR/10,500 ft and eventually crisscrossed the flightpath of 
NASA 870 once they passed. 
Abeam Palmdale Regional Airport (PMD), NASA 870 was given traffic on an aircraft off to the left of it 
which was indicating 8,600 ft while squawking 1200, and NASA 870 responded with “Traffic detected”. 
Another aircraft VFR/7,500 ft was overtaken from PMD toward VCV just after VCV and prior to APLES fix; 
a descent was only provided once requested, when north of that aircraft. 
The pilot requested lower – requesting 6,000 ft when MVAs prevented the controller from providing it 
immediately; NASA?870 was provided 7,000 ft and told to expect lower in one minute. Upon passing 
HELDE fix, NASA 870 requested 5,000 ft and the controller had already coordinated with VCV to get 
approval for a point out – descending NASA?870 into VCV’s Class D but remaining on Joshua Approach 
frequency (which seemed acceptable to the pilot, as well). On departure, NASA 870 remained at 5,000 
ft, requesting 6,000 ft now but also 9,000 ft for re-entry of R?2515: since there was no traffic, the 
controller provided a climb to 9,000 ft, and advised to expect handoff to SPORT shortly (they opened 
after NASA 870 had departed an hour prior from Edwards). NASA 870 was terminated prior to the 
restricted area boundary to SPORT for entry, and frequency change was accomplished matter-of-factly. 
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4 Lessons Learned 
Through all phases of flight to receive the NCC approval, many lessons learned were gathered and 
recommendations have been made. Some of the main lessons learned are described below. 
4.1 Spectrum Authorization 
? Description: IT&E and the AFRC Range Frequency Spectrum Management Office (RFSMO) did not 
have a good understanding of the Frequency Spectrum allocation/assignment/approval process 
for operations outside of SUA when developmental equipment interfaces with the operational 
NAS. Although the COA was approved in March 2018, addressing the spectrum issues caused an 
additional delay that pushed the flights into the NAS to May and June with chase and without 
chase, respectively. 
? Recommendation: Involve the RFSMO early in project to initiate National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) certification process (Fed Agency) or FAA licensing (non-
Federal) 
4.2 FAA Operational Approval 
? Description: FAA operational approval is independent of spectrum approval. The spectrum 
approval was an additional process to the COA being approved. 
? Recommendation: Involve FAA Spectrum Office early in formulation and Safety Risk Management 
(SRM) process. This task was missed during initial discussions due to lack of understanding of the 
process. 
4.3 Mission Design 
? Description: The final route of flight for NCC was iterative and protracted. IT&E initiated the 
development of the mission. Initial consideration focused on meeting the minimum objectives 
but also there were several options for executing the demonstration dating back to early 2015. 
As the mission plan got more refined (2017) the project tried to coordinate with the FAA for 
feedback. Routing was requested in August 2017; however, actual FAA review and 
recommendations came much later (March 2018) and some recommendations were to abandon 
early planning and go with a route where traffic was light or were existing COAs permitted 
operations (i.e. Riverside ANG route). The final mission plan was a variation of the San Joaquin 
Valley route. FAA leadership helped ensure that this flight plan was the best to demonstrate DAA. 
? Recommendation: Early involvement by the FAA to consider the route of flight and make 
recommendations is highly desired. 
4.4 Operational Rehearsal Mission 
? Description: Flight into the NAS with photo chase prior to executing full demonstration was 
beneficial to pilots and all flight crew. Practicing the route provided the crew with expectations 
for the second flight and allowed them to execute more smoothly. Additionally, the rehearsal 
mission provided the FAA confidence in the UAS system, as well as showing ATC what the flight 
without chase would look like in terms of control. 
? Recommendation: Operational "rehearsal missions" are beneficial to the team. Any time a similar 
mission will be executed, a rehearsal is recommended. 
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4.5 Popup Radar Tracks 
? Description: During the flight into the NAS without chase, a near range popup track was displayed 
on CPDS 15 seconds prior to CPA. Although noted, the crew did not respond, since the track was 
assumed to be a nuisance anomaly. 
? Recommendation: Support engineers should acknowledge the track and note it if it is not "real" 
traffic (e.g. birds). The crew, however, should call out "Check Display" to the pilots in order to 
increase their SA in case of an actual conflict. Additionally, the DAA system range circle can be 
reduced to below 10,000 ft to reduce tracks within range of conflict. 
4.6 DAA Phraseology 
? Description: During cruise at FL200 in the NAS (with photo chase), NASA 870 received a corrective 
alert on SWA462, B737 descending out of FL310 to FL220. ATC reported the traffic to NASA 870 
and pilot replied "looking".  
? Recommendation: The correct terminology in the MOPS for a UAS flying a DAA system is "traffic 
detected". It’s important to use correct terminology in order to educate others on the difference 
between UAS and piloted aircraft wording. During the flight with chase, the correct phrasing was 
used in another encounter. 
4.7 Adherence to IFR Altitude 
? Description: During flight out of VCV (out of class D airspace), the NASA 870 pilot began climb 
before receiving clearance from Joshua control. 
? Recommendation: Altitude changes, even planned and approved waypoint altitudes in this case, 
need to be cleared with ATC prior to commencing maneuver due to IFR flight plan. 
4.8 Radar Coverage 
? Description: Flights both with/without chase into the NAS experienced degraded ground radar 
coverage in ZOA around waypoints 5-6 (about 100 nmi away). 
? Recommendation: Consider receiving additional radar information (if available) for backup SA 
displays such as Zeus. 
4.9 DAA System Terminology 
? Description: In system checkout flights, pilots and some crew members were using 
corrective/warning and Traffic Advisory (TA)/RA terms interchangeably. These terms are not the 
same and caused some confusion between engineers. 
? Recommendation: Additional training/continuous review of terminology. Terminology "currency" 
is a must. 
4.10 Degraded C2 Link 
? Description: During the third SCO, NASA 870 experienced a degraded C2 link event. The aircraft 
which would have been used as an intruder (NASA 7, B200) was directed to turn into a safety 
chase. During this event, all crews practiced good CRM to land both NASA 870 and NASA 7 safely. 
? Recommendation: Continue assessing situations in real-time (remain vigilant) and follow CRM 
procedures. 
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4.11 Close Call Reporting 
? Description: Although the team was initially unsure of whether the degraded C2 event was 
considered a close call, they elected to self-report it as one. This led to an investigation by the 
NASA 870 team, which although delayed the next flight by a month, did provide insight into the 
system and how to mitigate in case of another event as this. The updated procedures did assist 
and were used on the next SCO flight. The crew followed their checklist and the flight continued 
as normal. 
? Recommendation: Report what may be considered a close call, even if unsure. 
4.12 High Speed Intruder Mission Rule 
? Description: During SCO, a G-III was employed as a "medium speed" TCAS II type intruder. The 
nature of medium speed would be to call a visual on NASA 870 1 nmi prior to CPA. Due to the 
more challenging maneuverability of the G-III within R-2515, 1 nmi for an abort may not provide 
adequate time/airspace for this aircraft to execute abort procedures safely. 
? Recommendation: All encounters using a G-III, regardless of card airspeed, should be considered 
"high-speed" and employ the 2 nmi visual required mission rule. 
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5 Conclusion 
The collaborative efforts between NASA, industry partners, and the FAA made it possible to perform the 
No Chase COA flights into the NAS: the entire process was an extremely successful demonstration of the 
DAA technology available and an exercise in securing a COA to fly a large UAS into the NAS without a chase 
vehicle.  
Although with delays, the demonstration flight into the NAS satisfied all phase 1 project milestones, using 
standards from the MOPS not previously executed operationally. The lessons learned gathered from all 
previous NASA UAS-NAS flights significantly reduced the amount of time to complete such an activity. 
With this flight, the hope is that the routine access of UAS into the NAS will increase, and that UAS 
operators will be able to file-and-fly easily and safely, without a COA into the NAS, just like any piloted 
aircraft. 
As a whole, the demonstration flight was an excellent conclusion of the flights with the NASA 870 Ikhana 
MQ-9. The milestone flight, traversing Class A, E, and D airspace and two ARTCCs, using DAA technology 
and without a chase vehicle, was truly a history making event and a milestone, for not just UAS 
development, but the future of all aviation. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Acronyms 
A/C Aircraft 
A/S Airspeed 
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System 
ACFT Aircraft 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array 
AFRC Armstrong Flight Research Center 
AFTC Air Force Test Center 
AGL Above Ground Level 
AJT Air Traffic Services 
ALT Altitude 
ALTCAL Altimeter Calibration 
ANG Air National Guard 
AOA Angle of Attack 
ARC Ames Research Center 
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ATAR Air-to-Air Radar 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
AUTO Automatic 
BRLOS Beyond Radio Line of Sight 
C2 Command and Control 
CA Collision Avoidance 
CAPS COA Application Processing System 
CAS Collision Avoidance System 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
COA Certificates of Waiver or Authorization 
COMEX Commence Exercise 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CPA Closest Point of Approach 
CPDS Conflict Prediction and Display System 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
DAA Detect and Avoid 
DAL Design Assurance Level 
DATR Dryden Aeronautical Test Range 
DD Decimal Degrees 
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DFCS Digital Flight Control System 
DGCS Digital Ground Control System/Software 
DGPS Differential Global Positioning Systems 
DIST Distance 
DLOS Digital Line of Sight 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment 
DR Discrepancy Report 
DWC DAA Well Clear 
EAFB Edwards Air Force Base 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
ETMS Enhanced Traffic Management System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FL Flight Level 
FOM Fiber Optic Multiplexers 
FSS Flight Service Stations 
FT2 Flight Test 2 
FT3 Flight Test Series 3 
FT4 Flight Test Series 4 
GA-ASI General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. 
GCS Ground Control Station 
GDT Ground Data Terminal 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GS Groundspeed 
H&S Health and Status 
HDG Heading 
HQ Headquarters 
HSI Human Systems Integration 
HUD Heads-Up Display 
IASP Integrated Aviation Systems Program 
ID Identification 
IFE In-flight Emergency 
IFF Identification Friend-or-Foe 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IP Initial Point 
IT&E Integrated Test & Evaluation 
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations  
KA King Air 
KEDW Airport Code for Edwards AFB 
KVCV Airport Code for Victorville 
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KWJF Airport Code for Gen William J. Fox Airfield 
JCF Joshua Control Facility 
LL Lost Link 
LOS Line of Sight 
LOWC Loss of Well Clear 
LVC Live Virtual Constructive 
Mag Magnetic Course 
MC Magnetic Course 
MCC3 Mission Control Center 3 
MD Mission Director 
MEA Minimum Enroute Altitude 
MEF Maximum Elevation Figure 
MEL Minimum Equipment List 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MOA Military Operating Area 
MOCA Minimum Obstacle Clearance Altitude 
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
MP Maneuver Point 
MSL Mean Sea Level 
MVA Minimum Vectoring Altitude 
NAC NASA Advisory Council 
NACP Navigational Accuracy Category for Position 
NACV Navigational Accuracy Category for Velocity 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association 
NAV Navigation 
NCC No Chase COA 
NCT Northern California TRACON 
NMAC Near Mid Air Collision 
NORDO No Radio 
NOTAM Notices to Airmen 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
O/S Ownship 
OML Outer Mold Line 
OROCA Off-route Obstruction Clearance Altitude 
OWG Operations Working Group 
PE Project Engineer 
PGDT Portable Ground Data Terminal 
PIC Pilot in Command 
PIRA Precision Impact Range Area 
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PM Project Manager 
PMD Palmdale Regional Airport 
PT Point 
RA Resolution Advisory 
RAIF Research Aircraft Integration Facility 
RCO Range Control Officer 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
REQ Required 
RF Radio Frequency 
RFSMO Range Frequency Spectrum Management Office 
RNG Range 
RTB Return to Base 
SA Situational Awareness 
SAA Sense and Avoid 
SAAP Sense and Avoid Processor 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SC Special Committee 
SCO System Checkout 
SCT Southern California TRACON 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SMURF Semi Mobile UAS Remote Facility 
SOR Senior Operations Representative 
SPD Speed 
SPORT Space Positioning Optical Radar Tracking 
SRC Source 
SRM Safety Risk Management 
SRMD Safety Risk Management Document 
SRMP Safety Risk Management Panel 
SS Self Separation 
SSA System Safety Assessment 
SSWG System Safety Working Group 
STA Special Temporary Authorization 
STM Surveillance and Tracking Module 
SUA Special Use Airspace 
TA Traffic Advisory 
TC Test Conductor 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TCOR Test Coordinator 
TCPA Time to Closest Point of Approach 
TD Test Director 
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities 
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TRK Track 
TSO Technical Standard Order 
TSPI Time, Space, Position Information 
UA Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAS-NAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System 
V/V Vertical Velocity 
VBA Visual Basic for Applications 
VCV Victorville Airport 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VID Visual Identification 
VIT Variable Information Table 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range 
VSI Vertical Speed Indicator 
WG Working Group 
WP Waypoint 
WPT Waypoint 
ZAB Albuquerque ARTCC 
ZDV Denver ARTCC 
ZLA Los Angeles ARTCC 
ZLC Salt Lake ARTCC 
ZOA Oakland ARTCC 
ZSE Seattle ARTCC 
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6.2 References 
Document Number  Document Title  
NASA NCC FTP 20180417 No Chase COA Flight Test Plan 17 April 2018 
NASA AFRC AFOP-7900.3-006 Aircrew Flight Operations Manual 
NASA AFRC AFPL-7900.3-001 Mission Control Qualification & Training Plan 
NASA AFRC DCP-S-001 Aircraft Mishap Response Procedure 
NASA AFRC AFOP-8715.3-005 Hazard Management Procedure 
NASA AFRC AFOP-8715.3-007 System Safety Support 
EDWARDSAFBI 13-100 Edwards Air Force Base Instruction 13-100 
R-2508 1 Jan 2017 R-2508 Complex User’s Handbook 
FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment, 
2017-WSA-148-COA 
Department of Transportation: FAA Certificate of Waiver 
or Authorization 
NASA DAA SRMD v1.2  
SRMD for UAS Operations in the NAS with Onboard DAA 
Technology with No Chase/Observer 
RTCA DO-365 
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 
Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems 
RTCA DO-366 
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 
Air-to-Air Radar for Traffic Surveillance 
FAA TSO-C211 Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems 
FAA TSO-C212 Air-to-Air Radar (ATAR) for Traffic Surveillance 
DO-178C 
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification 
Title 14 CFR Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules 
14 CFR Appendix E to Part 43 Altimeter System Test and Inspection 
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6.3 Definition of Terms 
Scripted Encounters This test configuration investigates the advisories generated by the DAA and 
Collision Avoidance Algorithm display provided by GA-ASI and fed by data from 
live aircraft during flight.  
Ownship Ownship aircraft provides the DAA algorithm host solution for testing airborne 
geospatial encounters with target (intruder) aircraft. The ownship was the 
Ikhana NASA 870 UAS. DAA alerting solutions are presented to the ground 
control station pilot who determines the best course of action based on display 
alerting evaluation and ATC coordination. 
Intruder Intruder aircraft (when properly equipped) provided a target solution for the 
DAA algorithm. Various encounter geometries were planned using intruder 
aircraft. 
Blunder A planned vertical or horizontal maneuver performed by the intruder, ownship 
or both aircraft that occurs at some point during the flight test encounter. 
Mitigated Flight test encounters that are designed for the controlling UAS pilot to either 
manually respond to a DAA or RA alert or monitor the aircraft response during 
an automatic RA alert. Mitigated test encounters are typically planned with 
vertical, lateral, and timing flight safety margins designed into the flight test 
encounters to help minimize the potential for an inflight collision. 
Unmitigated Flight test encounters that due to adequate vertical offsets do not require an 
associated lateral offset for flight safety. Unmitigated encounters are non-
maneuvering. 
Class A Class A airspace is from 18,000 ft MSL up to and including FL600. This airspace 
is conducted under IFR. 
Class E Class E airspace is up to but not including 18,000 ft MSL (Class A lower limit), 
with most of the United States being within Class E. Without a base, Class E 
begins at 14,500 ft MSL. Most areas depict this airspace base as 1,200 ft AGL, 
700 ft AGL, or surface. 
Class D Class E airspace refers to airspace around airports with an operational control 
tower. This airspace is from surface to 2,500 ft AGL of the airport elevation. 
Class G Class G airspace, or uncontrolled airspace, extends from surface to the base of 
the overlying Class E airspace. 
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6.4 Approved COA 
The following is the No Chase COA approved by the FAA dated 30 March 2018. 
FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment 
2017-WSA-148-COA
  Version Date: November 1, 2017 
Page 1 of 18 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
CERTIFICATE OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION
ISSUED TO 
Public Agency – NASA        Part 91 
ADDRESS 
NASA – AFRC Operations 
Attn. of: Dana Purifoy, Director of Operations 
P.O. Box 273, Mail Code 2802 
Edwards, CA 93523-0273 
This certificate is issued for the operations specifically described hereinafter. No person shall conduct any 
operation 
pursuant to the authority of this certificate except in accordance with the standard and special provisions 
contained in this certificate, and such other requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations not 
OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED 
Operation of the NASA Ikhana Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in Class A, Class D, 
Class E airspace at or below Flight Level 200 in the vicinity of R-2508/R-2515 Complex 
under the jurisdiction of Edwards AFB (EDW), Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA), Oakland 
ARTCC (ZOA), and Joshua Control Facility (JCF), and Victorville Airport Traffic Control 
Tower (ATCT). Operation will use Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Air-to-Air (A/A) radar 
sensor technology. 
LIST OF WAIVED REGULATIONS BY SECTION AND TITLE 
?
14 CFR 91.113(b) 
STANDARD PROVISIONS
1.   A copy of the application made for this certificate shall be attached and become a part hereof. 
2.  This certificate shall be presented for inspection upon the request of any authorized representative of 
the Federal Aviation Administration, or of any State or municipal official charged with the duty of enforcing 
local laws or regulations. 
3.  The holder of this certificate shall be responsible for the strict observance of the terms and provisions 
contained herein. 
4.  This certificate is nontransferable. 
Note-This certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal rules or regulations specifically referred to 
above. It does not constitute a waiver of any State law or local ordinance. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
?
Special Provisions A thru E, inclusive, are set forth on the reverse side hereof. 
?
The certificate 2017-WSA-148 is effective from April 2, 2018, to May 31, 2018, and is 
subject to cancellation at any time upon notice by the Administrator or his/her 
authorized representative. 
?
?
BY DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
?
? ?
?
FAA Headquarters, AJV-115 Scott J. Gardner 
(Region)                                                                                                                                      (Signature) 
?
?
             March 30, 2018                       Acting Manager, UAS Tactical Operations Section 
(Date)                                                                                                                                              (Title) 
     FAA Form 7711-1 (7-74)?
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Purpose: To prescribe UAS operating requirements in the National Airspace System (NAS) for 
the purpose of Public Aircraft Operations. The holder of this COA will be referred herein as the 
“Proponent.”
Public Aircraft 
1. A public aircraft operation is determined by statute, 49 USC §40102(a)(41) and §40125. 
2. All public aircraft flights conducted under a COA must comply with the terms of 
the statute. 
3. All flights must be conducted per the declarations submitted in the application, and 
as specified in the following Standard/Special Provisions. 
4. This COA provides an alternate means of complying with 14 CFR §91.113(b) for 
unmanned aircraft operations.  
5. All operations will be conducted in compliance with Title 14 CFR §91 and the conditions 
of the authorization issued herein.  If the operator cannot adhere to any of these 
requirements a separate FAA Form 7711-2 Waiver application may be required. 
?
STANDARD PROVISIONS 
?
A. General. 
1. The review of this activity is based upon current understanding of UAS operations and 
their impact in the NAS. This COA will not be considered a precedent for future 
operations.  As changes occur to policy, procedures, and regulatory requirements, 
limitation and conditions for UAS operations will be adjusted.
2. All personnel connected with the UAS operation must read and comply with the contents 
of this authorization and its provisions. 
3. A copy of the COA including the special limitations must be immediately available to all 
operational personnel at each operating location whenever UAS operations are conducted. 
4. This authorization may be canceled at any time by the Administrator, the person 
authorized to grant the authorization, or the representative designated to monitor a 
specific operation. As a general rule, this authorization may be canceled when it is no 
longer required, there is an abuse of its provisions, or when unforeseen safety factors 
develop. Failure to comply with the authorization is cause for cancellation. The proponent 
will receive a written notice of cancellation. 
5. During the time this COA is approved and active, a site safety evaluation/visit may be 
accomplished to ensure COA compliance, assess any adverse impact on ATC or airspace, 
and ensure this COA is not burdensome or ineffective.  Deviations, 
accidents/incidents/mishaps, complaints, etc., will prompt a COA review or site visit to 
address the issue.  Refusal to allow a site safety evaluation/visit may result in cancellation 
of the COA. Note: This section does not pertain to agencies that have other existing 
agreements in place with the FAA. 
6. Frequency spectrum approval is independent of the COA process and requires the 
proponent to obtain certification and frequency assignments (licenses) from the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) (47 CFR Part 300) or 
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Federal Communications Commission (47 CFR Part 2, Subpart J and 47 CFR Part 87, 
Subpart D) and frequency licenses (47 CFR Part 87) when applicable for the control link, 
ATC radios, transponders, detect and avoid systems, and navigation systems used to 
support this COA.  Equipment licensed under 47 CFR Part 5 (Experimental) or 47 CFR 
Part 15 (Radio Frequency Devices) does not provide the protection necessary for NAS 
operations.
B. Airworthiness Certification. 
The Unmanned Aircraft System will be maintained in a condition for safe operation while 
conducting operations in the NAS.  The proponent has made its own determination that the 
unmanned aircraft is airworthy. The unmanned aircraft system must be operated in strict 
compliance with all provisions and conditions contained in the Airworthiness Safety 
Release, including all documents and provisions referenced in the COA application. 
C. Operations.
1. Unless otherwise authorized as a special provision, a maximum of one unmanned aircraft 
will be controlled: 
a. From a single control station, and 
b. By one pilot at a time.  
2. A Pilot-in-Command (PIC) is the person who has final authority and responsibility for 
the operation and safety of flight, has been designated as PIC before or during the flight, 
and holds the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the conduct 
of the flight. The responsibility and authority of the PIC as described by 14 CFR §91.3, 
Responsibility and Authority of the Pilot-in-Command, apply to the unmanned aircraft 
PIC. The PIC position may rotate duties as necessary with equally qualified pilots. The 
individual designated as PIC may change during flight.
Note: Flight Crew Member (UAS). In addition to the flight crew members identified in 14 CFR 
Part 1, Definitions and Abbreviations, an Unmanned Aircraft System flight crew members 
include pilots, sensor/payload operators, and visual observers and may include other persons as 
appropriate or required to ensure safe operation of the aircraft. 
3. Operations (including lost link procedures) should not be conducted over populated areas, 
heavily trafficked roads, or an open-air assembly of people, unless the Airworthiness 
Certification does not restrict these operations. 
4. When necessary, transit of airways and routes must be conducted as expeditiously as 
possible. The unmanned aircraft should not plan to loiter on Victor airways, jet routes, Q 
and T routes, IR routes, or VR routes. 
5. For flights operating on an IFR clearance, the PIC must ensure positional information in 
reference to established National Airspace System (NAS) fixes, NAVAIDs, and/or 
waypoints are provided to ATC.  The use of latitude/longitude positions is not authorized, 
except oceanic flight operations. 
6. UAS operations at night, unmanned aircraft must operate with: 
a. Unless stipulated in the special provisions, an operational mode 3/A transponder 
with altitude encoding, or mode S transponder (preferred) set to an ATC assigned 
squawk
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b. Position/navigation and anti-collision lights on at all times during flight unless 
stipulated in the special provisions or the proponent has a specific exemption from 
14 CFR §91.209. 
7. Unless installed as part of a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, the use of a Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) in Traffic Advisory (TA) or Traffic 
Advisory/Resolution Advisory (TA/RA) modes while operating an unmanned aircraft is 
prohibited.
D. Safety of Flight. 
1. The operator or delegated representative is responsible for halting or canceling activity in 
the COA area if, at any time, the safety of persons or property on the ground or in the air 
is in jeopardy, or if there is a failure to comply with the terms or conditions of this 
authorization.
2. See-and-Avoid.
Unmanned aircraft have no on-board pilot to perform see-and-avoid responsibilities; 
therefore, when operating in the National Airspace System provisions must be made to 
provide an alternate means of compliance to 14 CFR §91.113. 
a. The operator and/or delegated representatives are responsible at all times for collision 
avoidance with all aviation activities and the safety of persons or property on the 
surface with respect to the UAS. 
b. UAS pilots will ensure there is a safe operating distance between other aviation 
activities and the unmanned aircraft at all times. 
c. Any crew member responsible for performing see-and-avoid requirements for the UA 
must have and maintain instantaneous communication with the PIC. 
d. Except when using an on-board detect and avoid system for 14 CFR 91.113(b) 
compliance, visual observers must be used at all times except in Class A airspace, 
active restricted areas, and warning areas designated for aviation activities or as 
authorized in the Special Provisions. Observers may either be ground-based or 
airborne in a chase plane.   
(1) Visual Observers: 
(a) Must be able to communicate clearly to the pilot any instructions required to 
remain clear of conflicting traffic, using standard phraseology as listed in the 
Aeronautical Information Manual when practical. 
(b) The PIC is responsible to ensure visual observers are able to see the aircraft 
and the surrounding airspace throughout the entire flight, and 
(c) The PIC is responsible to ensure visual observers are able to provide the PIC 
with the UA’s flight path, and proximity to all aviation activities and other 
hazards (e.g., terrain, weather, structures) sufficiently to exercise effective 
control of the UA to: 
? Comply with 14 CFR § 91.111, §91.113 and § 91.115, and  
? Prevent the UA from creating a collision hazard, and 
? Comply with all conditions of this COA. 
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(2) Chase Aircraft
(a) If the chase aircraft is operating more than 100 feet above/below and/or more 
than ½ NM laterally of the unmanned aircraft, the chase aircraft PIC will 
advise the controlling ATC facility. 
(b) Must remain at a safe distance from the UA to ensure collision avoidance if a 
malfunction occurs.  
(c) Must remain close enough to the UA to provide visual detection of any 
conflicting aircraft and advise the PIC of the situation.
(d) Must remain within radio control range of the UA to maintain appropriate 
signal coverage for flight control or activation of the Flight Termination 
System, for all operations when the UA is being flown by a pilot in the chase 
aircraft.  
(e) May be required to have communication with appropriate ATC facilities 
based on the operator’s application or mission profile.  
(f) Must maintain 5 sm in-flight visibility restrictions.  
(g) Pilot/observer:
? Will not concurrently perform either observer or UAS pilot duties along 
with chase pilot duties unless otherwise authorized.  
? Must maintain direct voice communication with the UAS pilot.  
(h) Pilots operating as a formation flight will immediately notify ATC if they are 
using a nonstandard formation. Nonstandard formations must be preapproved 
by ATC. Operators will adhere to the current edition of FAA Order JO 
7610.4, Special Operations, as applicable. See Volume 16, Chapter 1, Section 
2, for definitions of standard and nonstandard formations.  
(i) Operations will not be conducted in instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC).
(j) Operations will be thoroughly planned and briefed. 
(k) During a lost link situation, the pilot must be notified immediately along with 
ATC. The chase pilot will report to ATC that the UA is performing lost link 
procedures as planned or if deviations are occurring.
(l) Pilot will ensure safe separation with the UA, and immediately notify ATC 
and the UA PIC during loss of visual contact with the UA by both the chase 
pilot and observer, when such contact cannot be promptly reestablished. The 
UA PIC will either execute lost link procedures to facilitate a rejoin, recover 
the UA, or terminate the flight as appropriate. 
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E. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). 
1. A Distant (D) NOTAM must be issued prior to conducting UAS operations not more than 
72 hours in advance, but not less than 24 hours for UAS operations prior to the operation 
for routine operations unless operations are contained within Class A airspace, active 
restricted or warning areas that are designated on the appropriate aeronautical chart or 
airport directory. This requirement may be accomplished: 
a. Through the operator’s local base operations or (D) NOTAM issuing authority, or 
b. By contacting the NOTAM Flight Service Station at 1-877-4-US-NTMS (1-877-
487- 6867). The issuing agency will require: 
(1) Name and contact information of the pilot filing the NOTAM request 
(2) Location, altitude, or operating area 
(3) Time and nature of the activity. 
2. The area of operation defined in the (D) NOTAM must only be for the actual area to be 
flown for each day defined by a point and the minimum radius required to conduct the 
operation.
3. Operator must cancel (D) NOTAMs when UAS operations are completed or will not be 
conducted.
4. For first responders only.  Due to the immediacy of some emergency management 
operations, the (D) NOTAM notification requirement may be issued as soon as practical 
before flight and if the issuance of a (D) NOTAM may endanger the safety of persons on 
the ground, it may be excluded.  If the (D) NOTAM is not issued, the proponent must be 
prepared to provide justification to the FAA upon request. 
F. Reporting Requirements 
1. Documentation of all operations associated with UAS activities is required regardless of 
the airspace in which the UAS operates. NOTE: Negative (zero flights) reports are 
required. 
2. The Proponent must submit the following information on a monthly basis through the 
COA Application Processing System (CAPS): 
a. Name of Proponent, and aircraft registration number, 
b. UAS type and model, 
c. All operating locations, to include city name and latitude/longitude, 
d. Number of flights (per location, per aircraft), 
e. Total aircraft operation hours, 
f. Takeoff or landing damage, and 
g. Equipment malfunction. Required reports include, but are not limited to, failures or 
malfunctions to the: 
(1) Control station
(2) Electrical system  
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(3) Fuel system  
(4) Navigation system 
(5) On-board flight control system 
(6) Powerplant  
h. The number and duration of lost link events (control, performance and health 
monitoring, or communications) per UAS, per flight. 
3. Incident/Accident/Mishap Reporting
a. The proponent must provide initial notification to the FAA via email at mail at 9-
AJV-115-UASOrganization@faa.gov and via the CAPS forms (Incident/Accident) 
within 24 hours of an incident or accident that meets the following criteria:  
(1) All accidents/mishaps involving UAS operations where any of the following 
occurs:
(a) Fatal injury, where the operation of a UAS results in a death occurring within 
30 days of the accident/mishap 
(b) Serious injury, where the operation of a UAS results in:  
? Hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from 
the date of the injury was received; 
? A fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); 
? Severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage;  
? Involving any internal organ; or
? Involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 
percent of the body surface. 
(c) Total unmanned aircraft loss 
(d) Substantial damage to the unmanned aircraft system where there is damage to 
the airframe, power plant, or onboard systems that must be repaired prior to 
further flight 
(e) Damage to property, other than the unmanned aircraft. 
(2) Any incident/mishap that results in an unsafe/abnormal operation including but 
not limited to 
(a) A malfunction or failure of the unmanned aircraft’s on-board flight control 
system (including navigation) 
(b) A malfunction or failure of ground control station flight control hardware or 
software (other than loss of control link) 
(c) A power plant failure or malfunction 
(d) An in-flight fire 
(e) An aircraft collision involving another aircraft. 
(f) Any in-flight failure of the unmanned aircraft’s electrical system requiring use 
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of alternate or emergency power to complete the flight 
(g) A deviation from any provision contained in the COA 
(h) A deviation from an ATC clearance and/or Letter(s) of Agreement/Procedures 
(i) A lost control link event resulting in
? Fly-away, or
? Execution of a pre-planned/unplanned lost link procedure. 
b. Initial reports must contain the information identified in the CAPS Accident/Incident 
Report.
c. Follow-on reports describing the accident/incident/mishap(s) must be submitted by 
providing copies of proponent aviation accident/incident reports upon completion of 
safety investigations.
d. The above procedures are not a substitute for separate accident/incident reporting 
required by the National Transportation Safety Board under 49 CFR §830.5. 
e. For other than Department of Defense operations, this COA is issued with the 
provision that the FAA be permitted involvement in the proponent’s 
incident/accident/mishap investigation as prescribed by FAA Order 8020.11, Aircraft 
Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting.
G. Registration
The proponent must comply with the aircraft registration and marking requirements set forth 
in 14 CFR Parts 47 and 45, or Part 48, prior to conducting flight operations authorized by this 
COA. Title 49 United States Code (49 USC) sections 44101 through 44104 contain the laws 
requiring aircraft registration in the United States. 
H. Special Use Airspace 
1. Coordination and de-confliction between Military Training Routes (MTR) and Special 
Use Airspace (SUA) is the operator’s responsibility. When identifying an operational 
area the operator must evaluate whether an MTR or SUA will be affected.  In the event 
the UAS operational area overlaps an MTR or SUA, the operator will contact the 
scheduling agency as soon as practicable in advance to coordinate and de-conflict.
Approval from the scheduling agency is required for regulatory SUA, but not for MTR’s 
and non-regulatory SUA.  If no response to coordination efforts, the operator must 
exercise extreme caution and remain vigilant of all MTRs and/ or non-regulatory SUAs.
2. Scheduling agencies for MTRs are listed in the Area Planning AP/1B Military Planning 
Routes North and South America. If unable to gain access to AP/1B contact the FAA at 
email address mailto:9-AJV-115-UASOrganization@faa.gov with the IR/VR routes 
affected and the FAA will provide the scheduling agency information. Scheduling 
agencies for SUAs are listed in the FAA JO 7400.10.  
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
A. Coordination Requirements.
1. UAS Operations outside of the R-2508 complex will be conducted during daylight hours 
in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).  Each flight will be coordinated in advance 
with Los Angeles ARTCC, Oakland ARTCC, Joshua Control Facility, and Victorville 
ATCT. 
2. Proponent must ensure that multiple UAS in the operations area (i.e. lost link emergency 
profiles, spectrum, etc.) are deconflicted and separated from other UA operators that use 
the same operations area. 
3. Proponent must ensure the completed FAA coordination checklist (see attachment 2) 
with route of flight depiction is emailed to air traffic facilities NLT one business day 
prior to UAS operations. 
4. For IFR flights outside of restricted airspace that will enter Los Angeles Air Route 
Traffic Control Center (ZLA) airspace, coordination shall be accomplished a minimum of 
one business day prior , 9-awp-zla-mos@faa.gov   with Military Operations Specialist 
(MOS) at (661) 265-8249. 
5. For IFR flights outside of restricted airspace that will enter Oakland Air Route Traffic 
Control Center (ZOA) airspace, coordination shall be accomplished a minimum of one 
business day prior with ZOA Military Operations Specialist (MOS) at 9-awp-zoa-
mos@faa.gov or 510-745-3334. 
6. For IFR flights outside of restricted airspace that will enter Joshua Control Facility (JCF) 
airspace, coordination shall be accomplished a minimum of one business day prior with 
JCF, 9-awp-e10-tmu@faa.gov 661-277-3843.  
7. For IFR flights within Victorville (VCV) Class D airspace, coordinate with VCV Tower 
at 760-246-0817, wtaylor@serco-na.com one business day prior to flight. 
8. For IFR flights in the vicinity of Hunter, Roberts and Lemoore MOAs, proponent must 
coordinate deconfliction with Hunter, Roberts and Lemoore MOA respective scheduling 
agencies. 
9. Proponent must coordinate and deconflict all SUA with appropriate scheduling agencies, 
ATC will not coordinate SUA.   
B. Communication Requirements. 
The UA PIC will maintain direct two-way communications with ATC, and comply with all 
ATC instructions and procedures.
C. Flight Planning Requirements. 
1. All UAS operations conducted under this COA be on an IFR flight plan. 
2. Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, pilots shall maintain FL200 from route Way Point 
(WP) 1 until within 5 minutes of WP4. 
3. UA Pilot shall not request descent in ZOA airspace until after established on the 
southbound leg after WP6. 
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4. Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, UAS must maintain at or above 17,000 ft MSL 
while in Oakland ARTCC (ZOA) airspace.
5. The UA must operate an altitude encoding transponder with Mode C capability below 
10,000 feet MSL.In the event of transponder failure on either the UA or the chase aircraft 
(if used), the UA must conclude all flight operations and expeditiously return to its base 
of operations within the prescribed limitations of this authorization. 
6. If a chase aircraft is used, the chase aircraft transponders must be on standby while 
performing chase operations flight with the UA unless otherwise directed by ATC. 
7. In the event of UA transponder failure, a chase aircraft (if used) will operate its 
transponder in Mode C. 
8. When chase aircraft is utilized, the chase aircraft pilot shall maintain two-way radio 
communication with the UA PIC and an active listening watch on the assigned ATC 
frequency. Should the UAS experience communication difficulty or failure, the chase 
aircraft will assume responsibility for two-way radio communication with ATC. 
9. The UA shall be level at the ATC assigned altitude for transit of Class A airspace prior to 
exiting Restricted Airspace. 
D. Procedural Requirements. 
1. UAS must maintain at or above 17,000 ft MSL while in ZOA airspace. 
2. UAS DAA maneuvers must not enter active Hunter, Roberts or Lemoore MOAs. 
3. For Victorville Class D operations, VCV ATCT must be open and providing Class D 
services.
4. All operations in Victorville Class D airspace must be under daytime, VMC conditions. 
5. Minimum Vectoring Altitude for IFR aircraft over Victorville (Eastbound) is 7000 feet 
MSL.
E. Emergency/Contingency Procedures. 
1. Lost Link Procedures: 
a. In the event of a lost link, the UAS pilot will immediately notify the controlling air 
traffic facility via telephone numbers below, state pilot intentions, squawk 7400, and 
comply with the following provisions:  
ZLA: (661) 265-8205 
ZOA: 510-745-3438 
JCF: 661-277-3843 
VCV ATCT: 760-246-0817 
b. Specific Lost Link Procedure for No Chase COA Route: 
(1) UAS will maintain last altitude assigned by ATC. 
(2) In the event of a lost link, after exiting R-2515 and 5 minutes prior to waypoint 4 the 
UA will continue to waypoint 4, then execute a right turn direct CHADS to return to 
R2508/R2515.
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(3) If lost link within (inside) 5 minutes of WP4, the aircraft will continue the route to 
WP09, then return to R2515 via WP01. 
(4) If link is lost between WP09 and WP10, the UAS will continue to WP10 then return 
to R2515 via Direct WP01. 
(5) If link is lost after WP10, the UAS will continue the route to WP12, then execute a 
left turn Direct VEGAS (WP18) to return to R2515. 
(6) If link is lost after WP12, the UAS will continue the route to WP18 (VEGAS) then 
return to R2515. 
(7) If lost link occurs within a restricted or warning area, or the lost link procedure above 
takes the UA into the restricted or warning area – the aircraft will not exit the 
restricted or warning areas until the link is re-established or coordination via 
procedures above with ATC has occurred. 
c. The unmanned aircraft lost link mission should minimize transit or orbit over 
populated areas. 
d. Lost link programmed procedures will avoid unexpected turn-around and/or altitude 
changes and will provide sufficient time to communicate and coordinate with ATC. 
e. Lost link orbit points shall not coincide with the centerline of Victor airways.  
2. Emergency/Fly-Away Procedure: 
a. In the event of an emergency, the PIC will immediately contact the ATC facility 
having jurisdiction of the airspace, state the nature of the emergency and pilot 
intentions, and squawk 7700. 
b. In the event of a UA fly-away, advise ATC of the following: 
(1) Direction of flight 
(2) Last known altitude 
(3) Maximum remaining flight time 
3. Loss of Detect And Avoid (DAA) system will constitute an emergency.  The PIC must 
immediately contact ATC, state pilot intentions, and comply with all ATC instructions.  
4. Loss of communications: Squawk 7600, the PIC must contact ATC facility by phone, and 
advise of intentions. 
AUTHORIZATION 
This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization does not, in itself, waive any Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations not specifically stated, nor any state law or local ordinance.  Should the 
proposed operation conflict with any state law or local ordinance, or require permission of local 
authorities or property owners, it is the responsibility of the proponent to resolve the matter. This 
COA does not authorize flight within Temporary Flight Restrictions, Special Flight Rule Areas, 
regulatory Special Use Airspace or the Washington DC Federal Restricted Zone (FRZ) without 
pre-approval.  The proponent is hereby authorized to operate the Ikhana Unmanned Aircraft 
System in the NAS within the areas defined in the Operations Authorized section of the cover 
page.
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Attachment 1 
NASA No Chase COA Route Graphic 
Note: Altitudes for Planning Purposes Only 
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Detail of Victorville Overflight Box Route
Note: Altitudes for Planning Purposes Only 
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2017-WSA-148 No Chase Route Coordinates 
WP? LATITUDE?(N)? LONGITUDE?(W)? Comments?
1? 34°?49'?40.00"?? 118°?05'?48.00"? FL200?
2? 34°?47'?00.00"?? 118°?37'?00.00"? FL200?
3? 34°?54'?54.00"?? 119°?28'?34.00"? FL200?
4? 35°?07'?41.38"?? 119°?38'?09.42"? FL200?
5? 36°?09'?00.00"? 120°?25'?0.00"? FL200?
6? 36°?03'?35.73"? 120°?23'?25.22"? FL200?
7? 35°?36'?31.31"? 120°?01'?36.78"? 17,000?
8? 34°?54'?54.00"? 119°?28'?34.00"? 15,000?
9? 34°?47'?00.00"? 118°?37'?00.00"? 15,000?
10? 34°44'19.00"? 118°?13'?0.00"? 9,000?
11? 34°?40'?00.00"? 117°?36'?00.00"? 9,000?
12? 34°?35'?39.00"? 117°?23'?24.00"? 9,000?
13?(APLES)? 34°?32'?54.48"? 117°?08'?58.14"? 9,000?
14? 34°?42'?20.35"? 117°?05'?34.95"? 9,000?
15?(HELDE)? 34°?42'?16.29"? 117°?22'?57.18"? 6,000?
16? 34°?33'?43.03"? 117°23'?00.88"? 5,000?
17? 34°?33'?47.96"? 117°?25'?43.42"? 6,000?
18?(VEGAS)? 34°51'?19.00"? 117°?26'?03.00"? 9,000?
Note: Altitudes for Planning Purposes Only 
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NASA No Chase Route with Lost Link Overview 
Lost Link routes shown in Magenta 
Note: Altitudes for Planning Purposes Only 
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NASA No Chase Route Lost Link VCV Detail 
Lost Link routes shown in Magenta 
Note: Altitudes for Planning Purposes Only 
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Attachment 2 
UAS Flight Coordination Checklist  
NOTES: 
a. Coordination to Air Traffic facilities shall be completed NLT one business day prior to 
mission departure/TO time. 
b. Facilities must be notified within two hours of the proposed departure time if there is a 
weather or maintenance delay and what the new planned departure time will be.  
c. If two hours is exceeded, of proposed departure time, the facilities may require 
resubmitting mission plan with one business day notice requirement. 
d. When mission is cancelled email all facilities, within two hours. 
1. Mission Number - use also in email coordination subject line 
2. Call Sign and Type: 
3. Departure:  Airport, Local time and date/ Zulu and date 
4. Land :  Airport, Local and date/ Zulu and date 
5. Filed Flight plan: 34° 49' 40.00"N, 118° 05' 48.00"W; 34° 47' 00.00"N, 118° 37' 00.00"W; 
34° 54' 54.00"N, 119° 28' 34.00"W;  35° 07' 41.38"N, 119° 38' 09.42"W; 36° 09' 00.00"N, 
120° 25' 0.00"W; 36° 03' 35.73", 120° 23' 25.22"W; 35° 36' 31.31", 120° 01' 36.78"W; 34° 
54' 54.00"N, 119° 28' 34.00"W;  34° 47' 00.00"N, 118° 37' 00.00"W; 34°44'19.00"N, 118° 
13' 0.00"W; 34° 40' 00.00"N, 117° 36' 00.00"W; 34° 35' 39.00"N, 117° 23' 24.00"W; 34° 32' 
54.48"N, 117° 08' 58.14"W; 34° 42' 20.35"N, 117° 05' 34.95"W; 34° 42' 16.29"N, 117° 22' 
57.18"W; 34° 33' 43.03"N, 117°23' 00.88"W; 34° 33' 47.96"N, 117° 25' 43.42"W; 34°51' 
19.00"N, 117° 26' 03.00" 
6. Altitude information :  
7. Duration of flight:
8. Pilot Contact information: POC telephone numbers, provide Ground Station phone numbers 
for this mission. Alternate contact numbers as appropriate. 
9. WX alternate/Mission Slippage - Date and time of flight.  If none state none. 
10. Restricted/ Warning Areas/ ATCAA’s - List all SUA including ATCAA’s that the mission 
will transit or delay in. NOTE: ATC will not obtain permission for transit or delays in SUA 
for missions. Mission planning, filing into or through an SUA or ATCAA indicates to ATC 
that prior permission has been obtained from the using agency. 
11. List all delays for flight – Restricted, Warning Areas,  ATCAA,  in FRD  - Format:   
 (Departure + ETE (hrs and minutes)  
12. Lost link Procedures: 
a. Pilot will contact air traffic facility/ center via land line immediately upon losing link 
and coordinate expected actions/routing/altitude of the aircraft. 
b. State lost link procedures. 
13. Email these attachments to all FAA facilities: 
(see Air Traffic Special Provisions, A. coordination Requirements).  
a. Ikhana coordination checklist. 
b. Route of flight power point/s – flight overview and sectional scale (2-3 per ARTCC), 
FRD’s along route. 
14. FAA Air Traffic facility contact numbers that the pilot will call are:  
1. JCF 661-277-3843 
2. ZLA OMIC (661) 265-8205
3. ZOA MOS 510-745-3334
4. VCV ATCT 760-246-0817
??? 
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6.5 SCO Test Cards 
The following are the redlined flight cards from the SCO flights performed with encounters. 
? Flight 2 – 15 February 2018
? Flight 3 Attempt 2 – 28 March 2018
??????

































1?? 
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6.6 TCOR Notes 
Below are the raw TCOR notes from SCO 2 and 3 where data was collected. 
Table 22. No Chase COA System Checkout Flight 2 Data and Observation Notes. 
Table 23. No Chase COA System Checkout Flight 3 Attempt 2 Data and Observation Notes. 
Ikhana NASA 856 NASA 808
Take Off 7:06 6:58 8:15
RTB 10:54 8:33 10:54
Land 11:18 8:47 11:22
Squawk 0403 / 0024 0426 / 0023 0037
ALT 29.92
MCC3
LVC
GCS
Admin Time Hack 1 7:12 Time Hack 2 8:47
Other
1
1
7
Intruder Ownship Altitude
Ownship
Pressure
Altitude at 
Ownship's Pressure
Pressure at 
Ownship's Altitude 
Corrective
Altitude
856 9000 29.92 8950 29.95 9000
808 15000 29.92 15040 29.86 15000
Run # Name or S/N Sign COMEX Start or tol. (sec) VID (NM) FL Init (M3)
IP KGS 
(Zeus)
IP Wind
Termination 
Time
TA RA Maneuver Results/Notes
1 SQK-6 - No VID 870 0726 0 090 on 325/11 7:28:43 Yes Yes Fly Through RA Monitor V/S This is an example 
856 0 1.1 085 -60 STRATUS not picking up ADS-B
1 SQK-6 - No VID 870 0726 0 090 on 325/11 7:28:43 Yes Yes Fly Through RA Monitor V/S
856 0 1.1 085 on STRATUS not picking up ADS-B
2 SQK-6 870 0738 0 090 on 7:39:40 Left Turn Left turn to the north
856 0 4.5 085 +5 A bit high; diving into IP for speed Not receiving STRATUS
3 SQK-7 870 0748 0 090 on 7:49:14 Yes Right Turn
856 0 Yes 085 0 Track 856 off Zeus; maintain 085 Light chop at 8500
4 SQK-8 - abort 870 0801 0 090 on abort abort abort abort; lost KU; DAA system went down Turning on mode C
856 -5 087 -5 7 gallons remaining 
5 SQK-8 870 0809 -2 090 on 8:10:45 Right Turn
856 10 2.6 086 on 
6 LALT-24 870 0820 0 062 on 8:23:15 Yes Yes Fly Through
Receiving RA, Red banding at 2.4 nm
Climb 1000 fpm
856 +5 1 060 +10 Continued in mode C NASA 808 Taxing 0819
7 LALT-25 870 0830 0:00:00 062 on 8:32:24 Yes Right Turn Right turn, yellow banding 020/13
856 -5 057
Squawk off; joker; still dropping 856 track on Zeus; running 
encounter at 057
8 ATCAS-22 NoVID 856 0859 +5 210 on 8:59:46 Yes Yes Fly Through RA before IP - Fly Through ALT Cal with 808 at 15000
808 -20 0.5 205 +60 Called ROLEX; had RA - followed it 
9 ATCASS-22 856 0915 0 on on 870:244@46 9:16:12 Yes Yes No increased alert for TCAS Red line: No decent; 09:05:00; winds 245/53
808 -15 0.5 +50 245:53@20.5 ROLEX
10 ATCAS-23 870 0928 on 9:29:30 Yes Yes Climb; Auto to clear of conflict Visual required 2 miles
808 +5 2.5 on +60 ROLEX Sport 16000 22000
11 NUIS-13 870 0945 0 160 on 9:47:03 Yes Left Turn; heading 190 16000 IP Sport 160-220 7000 across board; moved to card 11 due to altitude restriction; abort deconfliction 17000
808 +10 +60 Decent to 19000
12 NUIS-14 870 0956 0 090 +40 9:58:20 Yes Decent at 09:57:08 Run card as is
808 0 2 120 +6
13 DB-15 870 1020 0 070 -5 10:22:00 Yes Yes Left Turn; leveling at 8000 Bad SAAP; reset SAAP and radar
ROLEX
808 0 125 +17
14 HS-11 870 1033 0 090 +2 10:35:24 Yes Yes Fly Through TA monitor Vertical Speed; RA at 6.8 nm ROLEX
808 +5 1.7 086 -6 0 Yes Yes 808 RA at 2.6 nm
15 TM-1 870 1041 +5 120 +20 10:42:47 Yes Yes Fly Through Test mode set to 253; TA at 4 nm ROLEX; abort abort abort - no visual 
808 -15 0.7 118 -3 0.75 nm visual
16 HDR-16 870 1051 0 105 +22 10:53:39 Fly Through Test mode is 0
808 -5 201 +70 ROLEX
Number of Resets 
Number of Rolexs 
Alt Cal
Zeus Nominal // Complete
Nominal
All systems under test are up and nominal
Sport // Mercury Spin and Four Corners 060B100 // 
Number of Repeats 
Ikhana NASA7
Take Off 0605 0630
RTB 10:00 10:00
Land 10:25 10:24
Squawk 0477 0401
ALT
MCC3
LVC
GCS
Admin Time Hack 1 Time Hack 2
Other
1
4
1
6
Intruder Ownship Altitude
Ownship
Pressure
Altitude at 
Ownship's Pressure
Pressure at 
Ownship's Altitude 
Corrective
Altitude
NASA7 15000 29.92 15050 29.86 15000
Intruder Initial altitude (in the "FL Init (M3)" column) read from Zeus 
Run # Name or S/N Sign COMEX Start or tol. (sec) VID (NM) FL Init (M3)
IP KGS 
(Zeus)
IP Wind
Termination 
 Time
TA RA Maneuver Quality Results/Notes
1 KU-01 870 0655 -20 155 on 6:57:00 Yes Yes Fly Through No C-Band (up/down); C-Band back up after terminate
KU-01 7 +7 1 152 on Yes
2 KU-02 870 0705 +3 150 on 7:06:43 Yes Left No C-Bank up/down; C-Band between cards
KU-02 7 -23 5.5 152 -5
3 OTD-25 870 0716 +10 150 +15 7:18:11 Yes Right GDT back on; ADS-B off
OTD-25 7 +15 2.5 180 +26
4 UC-02 870 0731 +2 149 +3 7:32:57 Yes Yes Climb ADS-B on initial COMEX: 0726 > ROLEX, 0729 > Reset: 0731; target it 218̊ (late start)
UC-02 7 -10 1.4 127 on Yes Reset - intruder 40 seconds early 
5 IOT-17 870 0741 +10 120 +13 7:45:08 Yes Yes Fly Through HDIV Fusion; initially 4 NM ADS-B Only; Need 60 Sec to 3 NM;; No active surveillance until 1.2 NM 
IOT-17 7 +60 4.5 119 +45 Visual before IP Only ADS-B from intruder
6 IOT-18 870 0850 -10 220 +2 8:52:30 Yes Right All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
COMEX: 0751 > ROLEX, new COMEX:  0752 > Reset: bad approach. Both aircraft were angled incorrectly (course wasn't parallel), timing was off, early RA
altering due to bad set up
Adding 10000 ft altitude to all encounters (intruder and ownship). SPORT placed an 18000 ft restriction in Mercury Spin (move to 4C) , so to continue flight 
testing (to not wait an hour), we moved above this restricted area
second attempt (after settling SPORT issue; encounter still hasn't been completed), COMEX: 0832 > abort abort abort: sensors feedback 
went off on its own. Sensors turned back on (on its own) (reason unknown)
third attempt: COMEX: 0842 > Reset > forth attempt: new COMEX: 0845 > ROLEX, new COMEX: 0846: Reset: bad intruder approach
fifth attempt: COMEX: 0850
IOT-18 7 +6 2.4 220 +60
All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction) (MS+4C) 
(870/220̅)
~0756 Sport order to wait at least an hour (traffic in the west and east). Intruder alt down to 11k for 1000ft separation during 1 hour wait
PIRA 0810 180
7 OOT-19 870 0906 +5 220 -40 9:08:10 Yes Yes Left All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction) Position Swap 870 N 7S; adjusting for run in line reposition 
OOT-19 7 +18 2 217 +29 All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction) ROLEX from 0900 to 0902; ROLEX from 0902 to 0903; ROLEX from 0903 to 0906; PIRA open in +25 0905
8 LT-20 870 0915 on 220 +4 9:17:34 Yes Yes Right All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction) TC switch from Steffi to Alex (TC in training)
LT-20 7 -60 2.5 225 -16 Yes All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
9 LT-21 870 0925 +6 220 +27 9:27:57 Yes Yes Descent All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
No TA due to 1300ft separation - repeat: Early TA at beginning of encounter, since advisory of 1000ft descent was taken, which was the cause of the 1300 ft 
sep.
LT-21 7 -25 2.1 225 +48 All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
10 LT-21 - Repeat 870 0935 +2 220 +20 9:31:06 Yes Yes Descent All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
LT-21 - Repeat 7 -30 1.1 226 +10 All alt +10000 (including abort and deconfliction)
11 KU-01 - Repeat 870 0946 +7 215 +40 9:48:32 Yes Yes Fly Through
New Altitudes: IP: 21500 CPA: 21500 Abort: 21500 Deconfliction: 
21500 ADS-B sensor deselected
KU-01 - Repeat 7 +40 2.1 212 -7 Yes
New Altitudes: IP: 21000 CPA: 21000 Abort: 14500 Deconfliction: 
14500
12 LOB-9 870 0956 +3 210 +20 9:58:00 Yes Yes Descent
New Altitudes: IP: 21000 CPA: 21000 Abort: 21000 Deconfliction: 
21000 TC called wrong ALT initially, corrected. Audio response
LOB-9 7 +17 1.5 234 +57 Yes
New Altitudes: IP: 24200 MP: 24200 CPA: 21200 Abort: 22000 
Deconfliction: 22000
13 LOB-10 870 1006 on 210 +2 10:08:09 Yes Yes Descent
New Altitudes: IP: 21000 CPA: 21000 Abort: 21000 Deconfliction: 
21000
LOB-10 7 +22 2.8 235 +13 Yes
New Altitudes: IP: 23200 MP: 23200 CPA: 21200 Abort: 22000 
Deconfliction: 22000
ROLEX Count
Alt Cal
Zeus Nominal // Complete
Nominal
All systems under test are up and nominal
Sport // Mercury Spin and Four Corners 060B100 // 
Number of Repeats 
Number of Aborts
Number of Resets 
